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A LONG-STANDING,  positive relationship  between the economic well- 
being of the poor and the growth of the economy has changed. In the 
1960s rapid economic growth and a relatively stable macroeconomy 
were associated with a 10  percentage  point reduction  in the proportion 
of people living below the official poverty line. Unstable macroeco- 
nomic conditions  in the 1970s  were associated with no progress  against 
poverty, and the recession of the early 1980s brought substantial  in- 
creases in poverty. Despite a sustained  macroeconomic  expansion  from 
1983  to 1989,  however, poverty reduction  was only moderate.  The pov- 
erty rate in 1989,  for example, was more  than 1 percentage  point higher 
in 1989  than  in 1979.  Thus, although  the experience  of the 1960s  had  sug- 
gested that  a "rising  tide raises  all  boats,"  persistent  poverty  in the 1980s 
indicates  a weakening  in the trickle-down  mechanism. 
In this paper,  we explore  how disadvantaged  individuals  and  families 
(those in the lower part  of the income distribution)  fared  from the eco- 
nomic growth  of the 1980s.  We start  by documenting  the seeming  inef- 
fectiveness of macroeconomic  growth  to help the disadvantaged  during 
this period. Movements  in both the poverty rate and family income in- 
equality indicate a break in the relationship  between macroeconomic 
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performance  and inequality  beginning  about 1983.  Forecasts of poverty 
rates  and family  income shares  based on equations  estimated  with data 
through 1983 underpredict  poverty in 1989 by 2.1 to 3.4 percentage 
points  and substantially  overpredict  the share  of income accruing  to the 
lowest quintile. 
Next we assess some alternative  explanations  for the changing  rela- 
tionship  between macroeconomic  activity and the income of the poor. 
We find that increased family income inequality is largely associated 
with increased wage inequality, particularly  for primary  earners. By 
contrast, shifts in labor's share of national  income do not play an im- 
portant role in increased inequality. Thus, explanations for why the 
problems  of the disadvantaged  appear  to have worsened in a period of 
apparent  prosperity  must  focus on the factors that have shifted  relative 
labor  demand  away  from  less skilled  workers  and  generated  tremendous 
increases  in wage inequality. 
To examine  the determinants  of economic well-being  requires  a reli- 
able measure of material  welfare. Although government statistics on 
family incomes clearly suggest a deterioration  in the standard  of living 
for a large share  of American  families  over the past two decades, some 
researchers  have started  to question  whether  such income statistics  ac- 
curately  capture  changes  in the level and distribution  of economic well- 
being. Christopher  Jencks, for example, has found that more "direct" 
measures  of well-being  (like life expectancy and housing  conditions)  in- 
dicate that living standards  continued to improve rapidly during the 
1970s.  1  And Susan  Mayer  and  Jencks  have argued  that  alternative  meas- 
ures  to income  indicate  little increase  in the inequality  of economic well- 
being  over the past two decades.2 
To address  these concerns, we move beyond comparisons  of current 
money income in our assessment of the changes in the distribution  of 
economic  welfare.  To do this, we look at the distribution  of consumption 
in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s using household survey data from the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). Although consumption data 
have many problems of their own, the permanent-income  hypothesis 
suggests that changes in the distribution  of consumption  may measure 
1. Jencks  (1984). 
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changes  in the distribution  of economic status more accurately  than do 
changes  in the distribution  of current  money income. 
From our examination  of household consumption  data, we find  first 
that  the distribution  of consumption  is substantially  more  equal  than  the 
distribution  of income. This  finding  is consistent  with evidence  from  ear- 
lier  household  budget  studies  presented  by Milton  Friedman  in his work 
on the permanent-income  hypothesis.3  Our data show that the lowest 
quintile  of the consumption  distribution  receives about 15  percent  more 
resources  than  does the lowest quintile  of the income distribution. 
Second, however, we find that recent trends in the distribution  of 
consumption  closely mirror  those in the distribution  of income. Con- 
sumption  inequality  increased  along  with  income  inequality  in the 1980s, 
particularly  for the nonelderly. We also find that the relation  between 
income and consumption appears to deteriorate  over the past thirty 
years, though  this deterioration  is not serious enough  to detract  greatly 
from  the usefulness  of income comparisons  for the nonelderly.  We con- 
clude that changes in the distribution  of income continue to provide 
fairly  accurate  guides  to changes  in the distribution  of economic  welfare. 
But, of course, consumption  data and alternative  measures  of material 
deprivation  and  living  conditions,  such as those proposed  by Mayer  and 
Jencks as well as by Jencks and Barbara  Torrey, can provide a useful 
supplement  to income comparisons  by pinpointing  the prevalence of 
specific  material  hardships.4 
Finally, we explore which groups  were left behind in the expansion 
of the 1980s  and compare  the upward  mobility  of disadvantaged  young 
workers  in the 1960s  and 1980s.  We find  that young families  headed by 
less educated  workers  fared worst during  the 1980s  and that the differ- 
ence in the performance  of manufacturing  employment between the 
1960s  and  the 1980s  plays an important  role in explaining  the labor  mar- 
ket outcomes  for less educated  young  men. 
We conclude  that  while the disadvantaged  are greatly  affected  by the 
state of the macroeconomy,  economic growth  is not the only factor af- 
fecting  the economic outcomes of the disadvantaged.  Strong  macroeco- 
nomic performance  generates more employment  opportunities  and in- 
3. Friedman  (1957). 
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creases the rate  at which  all individuals  are  promoted  into higher-paying 
occupations.  Differences  across U.S. regions  and  metropolitan  areas  in- 
dicate  that  changes  in the earnings  and  occupational  status  of young  and 
less educated  workers  and changes in family income inequality  contin- 
ued to be closely related to local macroeconomic  performance  during 
the 1980s.5  The experience  of the 1990-91  recession reinforces  the per- 
ception that the poor bear a disproportionate  share  of the losses from a 
recession. 
Yet, other  factors  were not constant  during  the 1980s.  Changes  in rel- 
ative labor  demand  against  the less skilled  offset the effects of improved 
aggregate  employment  opportunities  during  the expansion of 1983 to 
1989.  In an environment  of persistent  and severe shifts in relative  labor 
demand  against the less skilled, a buoyant macroeconomy  alone may 
not be sufficient  to improve  the absolute  and  relative  living  conditions  of 
those from disadvantaged  backgrounds.  Policies designed to improve 
the skills of the disadvantaged  and a more generous safety net may be 
necessary to gain ground on poverty even with a booming aggregate 
economy. 
Macroeconomic  Growth and the Disadvantaged 
In this section, we document  trends  in macroeconomic  activity, offi- 
cial poverty rates, and family income inequality  in the postwar United 
States. We find  a strong  inverse  relationship  between indicators  of mac- 
roeconomic performance  and income-based  meas'ires of absolute and 
relative deprivation  through  much of this period. However, that rela- 
tionship has deteriorated  since the early 1980s, leaving a far more un- 
equal distribution  of income at the end of the 1980s  than would be nor- 
mally  expected. 
Macroeconomics  and Poverty 
Discussion of the disadvantaged  in the United States typically fo- 
cuses on the fraction  of the population  with current  money incomes be- 
low an absolute  poverty  line. Figure 1 shows the share  of the population 
5. Bartik  (1991);  Freeman  (1991a). David M. Cutler and Lawrence F. Katz  5 
Figure 1.  Poverty Rate and Poverty-Income Ratio,  1959-89 
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Source: Current  Population  Surveys.  The poverty  rate  is the official  poverty  rate, based  on annual  income  data. 
The poverty-income  ratio  is the average  poverty  threshold  for a family  of four  divided  by median  family  income. 
below the official U.S.  poverty line over the past thirty years. This pov- 
erty rate is produced by the Census Bureau and is based on annual in- 
come  data from the March Current Population Surveys,  or CPS.  The 
measure has been  criticized  in various  ways.6  First,  since  the family 
classifications have changed through time, the official poverty rate does 
not  measure  a consistent  set  of  people.  Second,  the  official poverty 
threshold is updated using the consumer  price index (CPI), which has 
historically overweighted house price changes in measuring living costs. 
Both of these problems tend to overstate poverty in recent years relative 
to earlier years.  For comparison with past research, we use the official 
measures of poverty in this section; later we show that these two factors 
do not greatly affect the qualitative nature of our results. 
Poverty rates are clearly countercyclical  and responsive to the rate of 
economic  growth.  Aggregate poverty  fell by 50 percent between  1959 
and the early 197Us,  corresponding  to the prolonged  expansion of that 
6.  See Ruggles  (1990)  for a comprehensive  discussion  of the problems  with  the official 
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period. In the 1970s, when the economy grew slowly, poverty rates 
stayed relatively  constant. And, in the recession of the early 1980s,  the 
poverty  rate  increased  almost  4 percentage  points. Since 1982,  however, 
the poverty  rate  has declined  only slowly and  in 1989  remained  above its 
levels in the late 1970s  and  far  above its nadir  of 11.1  percent  reached  in 
1973.  As figure  1 indicates,  the decline in poverty in the post-1983  mac- 
roeconomic  expansion  was much less rapid  than in the long expansion 
of the 1960s. 
Much research  has found that trends  in poverty are strongly  related 
to the growth of the living standards  of the typical family, proxied by 
median  or mean real family income.7  The ratio of the average  poverty 
threshold  for a family  of four  to median  family  income is also displayed 
in figure  1. Since the poverty  threshold  is a fixed  real  dollar  amount,  real 
economic growth that raises incomes throughout  the income distribu- 
tion naturally  lowers the share of the population  below the threshold. 
As figure  1 shows, although  poverty  rates are highly  correlated  with the 
ratio of the poverty line to median income, the two series diverge in 
the 1980s.  Median  income  relative  to the poverty line grew rapidly  from 
1982  to 1989, but poverty rates fell only slightly. Poverty rates in the 
late 1980s  appear  higher  than can be explained by the performance  of 
median  real  family  income alone. 
Table 1 shows more systematic evidence on the relation between 
poverty and the macroeconomy.  The first row in the table reports re- 
gressions  of the aggregate  poverty rate  at time t (pt)  on a variety  of con- 
temporaneous  macroeconomic  indicators:  the poverty line-median  in- 
come ratio ([P/11), the inflation  rate (-7), the unemployment  rate of 
prime-aged  males (ut),  and  a post-1983  time trend  (1): 
(1)  Pt =  I  +  1  (P/y)t  +  P2  7t  +  3  ut +  4 T +  et 
The second  row of table 1 shows the results  using  the ratio  of the poverty 
line to mean  income, instead  of median  income. The two ratios  are  alter- 
native measures of income distribution  relative to the poverty scale. 
Equations  similar  to these were the basis for Rebecca Blank and Alan 
Blinder's estimates of  the  effects  of  macroeconomic activity  on 
poverty.8 
7.  See Blank (1991); Blank and Blinder (1986); Blinder and Esaki (1978); Ellwood and 
Summers (1986). 
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Table 1.  Regressions Relating Poverty and Macroeconomic Performance, 1959-89 
Pover ty  Un- 
linel  Poverty  employ-  Post-  Lagged 
Popuilation  median  linelmeani  Inflation  ment  1983  poverty 
group  incomea  itncomea  rate  rate  trend  rate  R2 
Total  0.645  . .  .  -  0.078  0.277  0.346  .  .  .  0.988 
(0.021)  (0.034)  (0.048)  (0.058) 
Total  .  .  .  0.669  -  0.085  0.454  0.539  . .  .  0.982 
(0.027)  (0.041)  (0.057)  (0.076) 
Total  0.411  ...  0.028  0.263  0.232  0.388  0.991 
(0.066)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.057)  (0.101) 
Total  ...  0.371  0.050  0.358  0.316  0.479  0.990 
(0.067)  (0.040)  (0.046)  (0.073)  (0.098) 
Adults (18-64)  0.405  . .  .  -0.038  0.509  0.353  .  .  .  0.936 
(0.033)  (0.050)  (0.070)  (0.087) 
Children (0-17)  0.690  . .  .  -0.008  1.050  0.881  .  .  .  0.946 
(0.052)  (0.078)  (0.110)  (0.137) 
Elderly (65 +)  0.473  . .  .  -  0.239  -  0.238  0.072  .  .  .  0.970 
(0.033)  (0.128)  (0.197)  (0.247) 
Sources: Poverty  rates  are from  Bureau  of the Census  (1991a,  tables I and  2); poverty  line is from  Bureau  of the 
Census  (1991a,  table  Al); mean  and median  income  are from  Bureau  of the Census  (1990,  tables 10, 11, and 14;  and 
1991b, tables  13 and  14); inflation rate is from Ecotonoic  Report of the Presidenit, 1990 (table C-58); unemployment 
rate is from Emtiployvnenit  and Earniings, various issues. 
The table  shows regressions  of the form 
Pt  =o  +  1  (P/Y),  +  2  Tt +  03  lit  +  4  T +  Et, 
where  p, is the poverty  rate at time t, (PIY),  is the ratio  of the poverty  line (the average  poverty  threshold  for a 
nonfarm  family  of four) to median  or mean family  income, n, is the inflation  rate (measured  by changes  in the 
consumer  price  index), u, is the unemployment  rate for men aged 25-54, T is a post-1983  time trend,  and et is the 
error  term.  The lagged  poverty  rate  is also included  as an independent  variable  in some equations.  Standard  errors 
are in parentheses. 
a. Mean  or median  income  is for all families  in the first  four  rows, for families  with  a household  head  aged  35-44 
in the fifth  and sixth  rows, and for families  with  a household  head  above  65 in the seventh  row. 
Macroeconomic  conditions  clearly  have important  effects on poverty 
rates. Reductions  in the ratio of the poverty line to median  income re- 
duce poverty, as do decreases in the unemployment  rate. Both are sta- 
tistically significant  in all estimated  equations. Also, in both equations 
an increase  in inflation  is associated  with a reduction  in the poverty  rate. 
Poverty rates in the 1980s  are greater  than can be predicted  on the 
basis of macroeconomic  conditions  alone, however. The post-1983  time 
trend suggests an unexplained increase in poverty rates of between 
one-third  (using  median  income)  and one-half  (using  mean income)  of a 
percentage  point annually.  Since mean income rose more than median 
income over the period, unexplained  poverty is greater  using  the mean- 
income ratio. Substantively  these estimates  are quite  large. They imply 
an unexplained  increase  in poverty of 2 to 3 percentage  points  by 1989. 8  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
One issue in interpreting  table 1 is the assumed  time structure  of the 
macroeconomic  effects-that  only contemporaneous  inflation  and un- 
employment rates affect poverty rates. Macroeconomic shocks may 
have a more long-lasting  effect on poverty rates, which decline only 
gradually.  To allow for this possibility, we include  lagged  poverty rates 
(Pt-  1)  in our  equations  as well: 
(2)  pt  -  o  +  1 (PI,  +  02 X  +  3  Ut +  4  T +  5 p,_  I  +  Et 
The third  and  fourth  rows of table 1 present  the results  from  these equa- 
tions. 
Estimates with the lagged poverty rate yield conclusions similar  to 
the equations  without  lagged  poverty  rates. The coefficients  on the post- 
1983  trends, for example, suggest that after 1983  annual  poverty rates 
fell by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage  point  less than  would  be predicted  given his- 
torical  relationships.  The result appears  quite robust. Blank  presents a 
variety  of alternative  specifications  and similarly  concludes  that  macro- 
economic variables  cannot  account  for the high  poverty  rates  of the late 
1980s.9 
A final  issue in these regressions  is our assumption  of constant  coef- 
ficients on the macroeconomic  variables. The equations in table 1 as- 
sume that there is a trend break  in poverty only, but no change in the 
responsiveness to the macroeconomy. To examine this further, we 
reestimated  the equations  in rows one and two using data  through  1983 
and then forecasted  poverty through  1989  using those estimates. There 
is clearly  a rapid  divergence  between actual  and  predicted  poverty  rates 
(see figure  2). Using the median-income  equation,  the difference  is 2.1 
percentage  points in 1989;  using  mean  income, the difference  is 3.4 per- 
centage  points. These results  are quite close to the predictions  from  ta- 
ble 1, suggesting  that  the assumption  of a trend  break  in poverty rates is 
justified. Importantly,  figure  2 shows no tendency for poverty rates to 
return  to their  predicted  level over time-the  difference  between actual 
and  predicted  poverty  rates  was larger  in 1989  than  in any previous  year. 
Indeed, in work first reporting  on this type of analysis, Blank and 
Blinder  simulate  poverty rates in 1989  under  alternative  post-1983  mac- 
roeconomic scenarios. Under a "noncyclical"  scenario, in which "un- 
employment  gradually  declines to 6.3 percent and inflation  remains  in 
9. Blank(1991). David M. Cutler  and Lawrence  F. Katz  9 
Figure 2.  Actual and Predicted Poverty Rates,  1959-89 
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Sources:  See table 1. The predicted poverty  rates are estimated  from the equations in the first two rows of table  1, 
using data from  1959 to  1983. 
the 4- to 5-percent  range,"  they forecast  poverty  rates to be 11.1  percent 
in 1989;  the more  "pessimistic"  scenario,  which "has  the unemployment 
rate stall out at 7 percent in 1985  and remain  there through 1989,"  re- 
sulted in an 11.5  percent  poverty rate.  10  In reality, macroeconomic  per- 
formance  surpassed  even the optimistic  "noncyclical"  scenario;  the ac- 
tual poverty rate in 1989,  however, was 12.8 percent, a rate exceeding 
even their  gloomiest  prediction. 
What  might  have caused  the poverty  rate  to deviate so markedly  from 
its historical  course?  A variety  of factors, ranging  from  changes  in trans- 
fer policy to population  aging,  may  affect  poverty  estimates  in ways that 
our  simple  time series equations  do not capture.  Taking  a look at transfer 
policy first, we find  that the inclusion  of additional  aggregate  variables 
designed to capture changes in transfer  policy (like the ratio of total 
transfers  to GNP) does not appear  to improve  the ability  to forecast the 
sluggish  decline in poverty rates since 1983. 
Next we examined the potential role of demographic  changes. Be- 
10. Blank  and  Blinder  (1986,  p. 206). 10  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
cause poverty rates for the elderly may be less sensitive to macroeco- 
nomic conditions than those for the nonelderly, the increasingly  aged 
population  may have caused a strong  macroeconomy  to generate  fewer 
benefits  for the poor. To address  this issue, we examined  poverty rates 
separately  for the elderly, children,11  and working-age  adults. Figure 3 
shows the trend  in poverty rates for these three groups, along with the 
poverty-income  ratio.'2  The figure  reveals a striking  difference  in pov- 
erty rates for the three groups. The dominant  source of overall  poverty 
reduction  since the mid-1970s  has been among  the elderly;  poverty  rates 
for working-age  adults and children  appear  far less responsive to eco- 
nomic growth. In the early 1960s,  poverty rates for the elderly were al- 
most 10  percentage  points  higher  than  for any other  group;  by 1989,  pov- 
erty among  the elderly  was almost  as low as for working-age  adults.  The 
group  most adversely  affected  by trends  in the 1980s  has been children, 
whose poverty rate  was almost  20 percent  in 1989.  The figure  suggests a 
more substantial  unexplained  poverty trend  for children  than  for either 
of the other  groups. 
The remaining  part  of table 1 confirms  that the unexplained  increase 
in poverty  is predominantly  among  persons  of working  age and  children. 
Here we present  regressions  similar  to those in the first  row, using  pov- 
erty for the three age groups  as separate  dependent  variables.  Poverty 
rates between 1983  and 1989  increased  by 0.4 and 0.9 percentage  point 
annually  for working-age  adults  and  children  relative  to predictions  from 
macroeconomic  equations.  These estimates imply  that poverty rates in 
1989 were 2 percentage points higher than expected for working-age 
adults  and  5 percentage  points  higher  for children.  There  was no statisti- 
cally significant  increase  for the elderly, however. 
The substantial  disparity  in poverty trends for the three age groups 
highlights  the importance  of separating  the population  by age when ex- 
amining  the effects of macroeconomic  performance  on poverty. A single 
explanation for changes in poverty in the post-1983 period will not 
suffice. 
1  1. Children  are  defined  in official  poverty  rates  as persons  below  the  age  of 18  that  are 
related  to the head  of the family  but  are not themselves  the head  of the household  or that 
person's  spouse. 
12. For the first two groups, we use median  income of families  headed  by a person 
aged  35-44 in the poverty-income  ratio;  for the elderly,  we use median  income  of families 
headed  by a person  aged  65 or older. Although  the age cutoff  is for the head  of the house- 
hold  rather  than  the head  of the family,  most  households  are  composed  of only one family. David  M. Cutler  and Lawrence  F. Katz  11 
Figure 3.  Poverty Rate and Poverty-Income Ratio, Selected Age Groups, 1959-88 
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Sources: See figure  1. For working-age  adults  (aged 1864) and children  (below age 18), the median  income  for 
families  with  a head  aged  35-44  is used to calculate  the ratio  of the poverty  level to median  income.  For the elderly, 
median  income  for families  with  a head  above 65 years  old is used in the calculations. 12  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1991 
Macroeconomics  and Income  Distribution 
Although  the official  poverty rate is a useful indicator  of the preva- 
lence of economic hardship  in the United States, there are a number  of 
reasons to look at other indicators  of the distribution  of economic well- 
being. First, since median  family  income  lies above the poverty  line and 
since the income distribution  is hump shaped, real income growth  will 
leave a declining  share  of the population  just below the poverty  line. The 
benefits  to poverty reduction  of a given shift in the income distribution 
will necessarily  decline  as well. Second, many  object  to the use of a fixed 
absolute poverty line since beliefs about what constitutes a "decent 
standard  of living"  are shaped  by median  or average  consumption  levels. 
This suggests the need to examine changes in the shares of income re- 
ceived by different  groups to determine  whether the impact  of macro- 
economic  performance  on the relative  incomes  of the disadvantaged  has 
changed. 
Table 2  shows regressions for the share of income received by 
quintiles  of the income distribution  (st). We estimate equations similar 
to those used in table 1 but include  the logarithm  of real  per capita  GNP 
in place of the poverty-income  ratio: 
(3)  st -3 Po +  ,1  n GNPt +  132Tt  +  P33Ut  +  P4T?+  15t-I  +  Et. 
We present the equations with and without the lagged income-share 
variables  included  as explanatory  variables. 
The evidence in table 2 suggests conclusions very similar  to those of 
the poverty  equations  in table 1. The post-  1983  period  witnessed  a large, 
unexplained  decline in the share  of income going to the lowest quintiles 
and a large  increase  in the share  of income going  to the upper  end of the 
distribution.  The first  three columns  of the table show the effects of the 
macroeconomic  variables  on income shares. The dominant  macroeco- 
nomic predictor  of changes in the income distribution  is the unemploy- 
ment rate. In periods  of low unemployment,  the share  of income to the 
lowest three quintiles  rises and that to the upper  two quintiles  declines. 
Neither  inflation  nor  GNP growth  has uniform  effects on income shares, 
and  both are sensitive to the form  of the estimated  equation. 
For all income groups, however, the post-1983  period  is an outlier  in 
the distribution  of income, with a substantial  shift in the distribution  to- David M. Cutler and Lawrence F. Katz  13 
Table 2.  Regressions Relating Income Distribution and Macroeconomic Performance, 
1947-89 
Real per  Lagged 
capita  Inflation  Unemploy-  Post-1983  incomne 
Income  quintile  GNP  rate  ment rate  trend  share  R2 
First (lowest)  1.03  0.0112  -0.145  -0.169  .  .  .  0.754 
(0.17)  (0.0088)  (0.020)  (0.025) 
0.52  0.0024  -0.091  -  0.075  0.554  0.869 
(0.18)  (0.0085)  (0.018)  (0.026)  (0.099) 
Second  -0.63  -0.0241  -0.161  -0.205  ...  0.879 
(0. 19)  (0.0101)  (0.023)  (0.029) 
-0.44  0.0030  -  0.088  -0.057  0.634  0.957 
(0.15)  (0.0080)  (0.017)  (0.025)  (0.085) 
Third  0.15  -0.0314  -0.079  -0.201  ...  0.722 
(0.19)  (0.0102)  (0.023)  (0.029) 
-0.21  0.0015  -0.045  -0.059  0.651  0.888 
(0.15)  (0.0085)  (0.015)  (0.026)  (0.096) 
Fourth  1.18  -0.0194  0.068  -0.111  ..  .  0.819 
(0.12)  (0.0065)  (0.015)  (0.018) 
0.57  -0.0047  0.042  -0.069  0.420  0.828 
(0.23)  (0.0083)  (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.144) 
Fifth (highest)  -1.68  0.0640  0.318  0.674  ...  0.769 
(0.50)  (0.0265)  (0.059)  (0.075) 
-0.03  -0.0075  0.185  0.219  0.648  0.907 
(0.41)  (0.0221)  (0.042)  (0.078)  (0.092) 
Sources: See table 1. The difference  between  tables I and 2 is that the dependent  variable  is now the share  of 
income  received  by different  quintiles  and  the logarithm  of real  per  capita  GNP  is used in place  of the poverty-income 
ratio.  Standard  errors  are in parentheses. 
ward the top quintile  and away from the other quintiles. Without  the 
lagged  share  variables,  the trend  coefficients  suggest  a decline  of 0.2 per- 
centage  point  annually  in the share  of income  going  to the lowest 60 per- 
cent of the distribution  and about 0.1 percentage  point annually  to the 
fourth  quintile.  Income in the top quintile  increased  by 0.67 percentage 
point  annually.  With  the lagged  share,  the trend  coefficients  suggest  de- 
clines on the order  of 0.057 to 0.075  percentage  point  annually  for all but 
the top quintile of the distribution,  which experienced an annual in- 
crease of more  than  0.2 percentage  point. All of these estimates  are sta- 
tistically significant  and imply extremely  large, unexplained  changes in 
the distribution  of income from 1983  to 1989. Since 1983  the income of 
the lowest quintile  fell between 0.5 and 1.0 percentage  point more than 
macroeconomic  variables  would  predict;  income  in the top quintile  rose 
between 1 and  4 percentage  points more  than  expected. 14  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2.1991 
As with the poverty  equations,  we tested our  assumption  of common 
macroeconomic  effects using  estimates  from  data  through  1983  and  pre- 
dicted income shares  in later years. Figure  4 shows the actual and pre- 
dicted income of the lowest quintile,  the highest quintile,  and the top 5 
percent  of the income  distribution. 
The figure shows striking  changes in the income distribution  in the 
1980s. Before 1960, there was no clear trend in income shares. In the 
decade of the 1960s, the share of total income received by the lowest 
quintile  increased  almost 1  percentage  point, with  a similar  decline  in the 
income share  received by the highest  quintile  (and  top 5 percent). Since 
the mid-1970s,  and particularly  in the 1980s,  however, these gains in in- 
come equality  have been eliminated.  Figure  4 suggests that in 1989  the 
income share  of the lowest quintile  was 1  percentage  point  below its pre- 
dicted level. The income share  of the highest quintile  was about 4 per- 
centage  points above its predicted  level, and the share  of the top 5 per- 
cent was 3 percentage  points  above what  had  been expected. All of these 
differentials  were wider in 1989  than in any previous year, having be- 
come progressively  larger  every year since 1983. 
In summary,  both the poverty  rate  and  the degree  of income inequal- 
ity increased  from  the late 1970s  to the late 1980s.  Although  the substan- 
tial increases in income inequality  and poverty between 1979  and 1983 
are  not surprising  given  the deep recession  of the early 1980s,  the contin- 
ued widening  of the income distribution  and the sluggish  decline in the 
poverty  rate  during  the macroeconomic  expansion  of 1983-89  represent 
a sharp  break from the postwar pattern. We estimate that the overall 
poverty  rate was about  2 percentage  points higher  in 1989  than  it would 
have been if previous  trends  had  continued.  Similarly,  the income share 
of the lowest quintile  was 1 percentage  point below its predicted  value, 
and  the share  of the upper  quintile  was 4 percentage  points  above its pre- 
dicted  value. 
Sources of Increased Poverty and Family Income Inequality 
In this section, we explore  potential  explanations  for the high  poverty 
and increased  family income inequality  of the 1980s. We first consider 
whether rising inequality  is related to a decline in labor's share of in- 
come (both national  and personal).  Since most families  receive little or Figure 4.  Actual and Predicted Income Shares, Selected Income Groups, 1947-89 
Share  of total income (percent) 
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Source:  See table 1. The predicted income shares of the lowest and highest income quintiles and of the top 5 percent 
are estimated  using the equations  in table 2 with data through 1983. 
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no capital  income, a shift  in national income  from  labor  to capital  could 
generate increased family inequality. We find, however, that labor's 
share of national  output, as conventionally  measured, did not decline 
noticeably  during  the 1980s. By contrast, labor's share of the types of 
income that make up family income in household surveys (essentially 
labor's  share  of personal  income) did decline substantially  in the 1980s. 
The decline in labor's share of personal  income reflects,  in part, an in- 
crease in the share of corporate  income distributed  as dividends (and 
thus included in personal income) relative to undistributed  corporate 
profits  (which are not included  in personal  income). Even with this in- 
crease in the share  of nonlabor  income in personal  income, the growth 
of nonlabor  income plays only a small  role in the overall rise in family 
income inequality. 
We next explore the argument  that increased poverty is largely re- 
lated  to changes  in family  composition.  The  past three  decades  have wit- 
nessed large changes in family structures-a  shift away from married- 
couple families toward single-parent  families. Although  this change in 
composition has probably increased the level of poverty and, less 
clearly, been associated with the increased "feminization"  of poverty, 
we conclude  that  it is not an important  explanation  for the failure  of pov- 
erty to decline  in line with historical  trends  during  the 1980s.  Even when 
changes in family structure  are controlled  for, there was substantially 
less poverty reduction,  and substantially  more inequality,  in the 1980s 
than in earlier  periods displaying  similar  movements in aggregate  eco- 
nomic  activity. 
Lastly, we examine the components  of family income and consider 
the sources of increased inequality.  Although  a voluminous  literature 
has examined  recent changes in U.S. wage inequality,  we consider  the 
relation  between  changes  in the dispersion  of head-of-household  income 
and total family income. We ask whether changes in the labor market 
outcomes of other family members  and changes in nonlabor  incomes 
have offset or exacerbated  the effects of increased  earnings  inequality 
among  primary  earners.  Although  the labor  market  performance  of sec- 
ondary  earners  has moved in the direction  of increasing  inequality,  we 
find  that  most of the change  in family  income  inequality  reflects  a widen- 
ing in primary-earner  income inequality.  We conclude that rising  wage 
inequality  associated with a change in the returns  to skill is the key to 
understanding  increased  family  income inequality  in the 1980s. David M. Cutler  and Lawrence  F. Katz  17 
Macroeconomic  Activity and Payments  to Labor 
A first potential explanation for increased inequality and income 
hardship  is that  the expansion  of the 1980s  has disproportionately  bene- 
fited  capital  relative  to labor.  This view is lent some credence  by the ob- 
servation  that productivity  in nonfarm  businesses grew almost 1.5 per- 
cent annually since  1982, while the real wages of production and 
nonsupervisory  workers  in nonagricultural  industries  fell. In fact, Law- 
rence Mishel and David Frankel  conclude that "a major  reason for the 
unequal  growth  in family  incomes  is that, in recent  years, a greater  share 
of our national  income has been in the form of capital  incomes (such as 
rent,  dividends,  interest  payments,  capital  gains)  and  a smaller  share  has 
been earned  as wages and salaries."13 
To evaluate  this issue, we form  two measures  of labor's  share  of out- 
put. The first, which we term the factor payments share, is the ratio of 
labor  payments  (employee  compensation  plus two-thirds  of proprietors' 
income)14 to total factor compensation  (employee compensation, pro- 
prietors'  income, net interest, corporate  profits,  depreciation,  and per- 
sonal  rental  income). We view this measure  as the extent to which labor 
in aggregate  is receiving  the fruits  of macroeconomic  activity. Total em- 
ployee compensation  is not what standard  micro  data  sets measure.  The 
earnings  data  in the household  surveys that are used to study  family  in- 
come inequality  only provide  information  on wages and salaries.  Total 
employee compensation  from  the national  income accounts (NIA) also 
includes other labor income (employer social-insurance  contributions 
and employer-paid  fringe  benefits). Further,  transfer  income, personal 
interest  income, and  personal  dividend  income are all counted  in family 
income measures,  but undistributed  corporate  profits  and depreciation 
are not. Accordingly,  we form  a second measure  of labor's  share  of pre- 
transfer income, termed the market-based  income share, defined as 
wage and salary payments plus two-thirds  of proprietors'  income, di- 
vided  by market-based  family  incomes (wages  and salaries,  proprietors' 
income, personal  interest  income, personal  dividend  income, and  rental 
13. Mishel  and  Frankel  (1991,  p. 29). 
14. We follow the standard  practice  of allocating  two-thirds  of proprietors'  income  to 
labor  and  one-third  to capital.  Plausible  alternative  treatments,  including  omitting  proprie- 
tors' income  entirely,  have little  effect on these calculations. 18  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
Figure  5. Labor's  Share  of Output,  1950-89 
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Source: National Income and Product  Accounts. Labor's share of total factor payments  is  total employee 
compensation  plus two-thirds  of proprietors'  income, divided  by the sum of employee  compensation,  proprietors' 
income,  net  interest,  rental  income,  and  depreciation.  Labor's  share  of market-based  family  income  is wage  and  salary 
payments  plus two-thirds  of proprietors'  income, divided  by the sum of wage and salary  payments,  proprietors' 
income,  personal  rental  income,  and  personal  dividend  and interest  income. 
income). Market-based  income includes the sources of income that are 
picked  up in household  survey measures  of pretransfer  family  incomes. 
These two measures  of labor's share  are depicted  in figure  5. Labor's 
share  of total  factor  income was virtually  unchanged  in the 1980s;  it was 
70.0 percent  in 1979  and  69.7 percent  in 1989.  Indeed, since 1950,  labor's 
share  of output  has been relatively stable, with the exception of a brief 
increase  in the late 1960s  and  early 1970s.  But  while labor's  share  of total 
factor  income  remained  constant,  labor's share  of market-based  income 
declined,  from 80.3 percent  in 1979  to 76.0 percent  in 1989.  The decline 
was driven  by the growth  in capital  incomes (particularly  personal  inter- 
est and dividend  income) relative to the growth  in wages and salaries. 
From 1979  to 1989, the sum of real personal interest and dividend in- 
come grew by 5.6 percent annually, while personal labor income in- 
creased by only 2.4 percent  annually.  The growth  in personal  dividend 
income relative  to labor  income reflects  a shift  within  the corporate  sec- 
tor from retaining  undistributed  profits (unrealized  capital income) to David  M. Cutler  and Lawrence  F. Katz  19 
paying  out dividends.  Since undistributed  corporate  profits  do not show 
up in measured  family  income, whereas  personal  dividend  interest  does, 
this shift will increase the contribution  of capital  income to total family 
income. The change is most naturally  viewed as an accounting shift, 
however, and not as an increase  in the share  of output  going  to capital. 
An additional  component  of the increase  in capital  income  is the rapid 
growth of personal interest income, particularly  government  interest 
payments, in the 1980s. The interpretation  of this shift, however, de- 
pends  on one's view of the incidence  of the taxes required  to pay  for gov- 
ernment  debt service. We thus conclude that although  labor's share  of 
national income has not declined, labor's share of our market-based 
family  income has. If this change were the major  factor in rising  family 
inequality,  one might  interpret  part  of rising  inequality  as somewhat  illu- 
sory, mostly  the result  of the failure  of family  income  measures  to pierce 
the corporate  veil. Unfortunately,  as we later document, rising  family 
income  inequality  is not an illusion. Furthermore,  the increase  in overall 
income inequality  is dominated  by increased  inequality  of labor  income 
rather  than  nonlabor  income.  15 
Changes  in Family  Composition 
A second potential  explanation  for the increase  in poverty  and  family 
income inequality  is a change in the nature  of families. The past three 
decades have witnessed a decline  in the share  of the population  in tradi- 
tional  two-parent  families  and an increase  in the share  of the population 
in single-parent,  often  female-headed,  families.  16 Because poverty  rates 
tend to be higher  for single-parent  families, shifts in the distribution  of 
the population  toward  these household  types are likely to be associated 
with increases  in measured  poverty. 
Table  3 shows the distribution  of the survey  population  across family 
15. The overall  importance  of changes  in labor  income  inequality  does not mean  that 
other  factors  do not matter  for some groups.  In the 1990  Green  Book, the Congressional 
Budget  Office  (Committee  on Ways and Means, 1990)  has carefully  documented  that  de- 
creased  transfer  payments  in the bottom  quintile  do play an important  role in the persis- 
tence of high  poverty  rates in the 1980s  and that  increased  capital  income  in the very top 
part  of the distribution  does contribute  to the sharp  rise in the income share  of the top 5 
percent  of the population. 
16. See Bane (1986) and Ellwood (1988)  for discussions of the causes and conse- 
quences  of changes  in family  structure  in the postwar  United  States. 20  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
Table  3. Family  Composition,  Selected  Years, 1963-89 
Percent 
Share of persons, by year 
Family type  1963  1969  1973  1979  1983  1989 
Husband-wife  families 
With children  64.7  61.4  56.2  49.7  46.2  43.5 
Without  children  20.1  21.3  23.2  24.5  25.8  25.8 
Male-headed  families 
Single  2.3  2.7  3.6  5.3  5.7  6.6 
With children  0.8  0.7  0.8  1.0  1.3  1.6 
Other  relatives  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.5 
Female-headed  families 
Single  3.7  4.5  5.2  6.5  7.0  7.7 
With  children  4.9  5.9  7.6  9.2  9.4  9.9 
Other  relatives  2.5  2.6  2.5  2.9  3.5  3.4 
Source:  Authors' calculations  based on data from the March Current Population  Surveys  (CPS). The table shows 
the share of persons  in each  family type in the indicated  years.  Children are persons  below  the age of  18 related to 
(but not including) the head of or spouse  of the head of the family. 
types for six years: 1963, 1969, 1973, 1979, 1983,  and 1989.  Two of the 
periods (1963-69 and 1983-89)  contain the sustained  economic expan- 
sions we would like to compare. The other years cover periods with 
more  mixed  economic  outcomes. The table  shows a pronounced  decline 
in the share  of persons in husband-wife  families  with children,  from al- 
most 65 percent  in 1963  to less than  45 percent  in 1989.  Some of the de- 
cline reflects the aging of the baby-boom  generation.  In 1963, the first 
cohort  of the baby  boom  was only 17  years  old;  in 1989,  the last cohort  of 
the baby boom was 25 years old. The increase  in husband-wife  families 
without children  may be one manifestation  of this change. Part of the 
change in family structure,  however, represents  a trend toward single 
family  heads away from  married-couple  families. In 1963,  for example, 
only 5.7 percent  of people  were in families  headed  by a single  parent  with 
children;  by 1989,  the percentage  had doubled.  17 
Clearly,  these trends  in household  composition  have shifted  the pop- 
ulation  toward  household  types that are more  likely to be poor. For our 
purposes,  however, a more  relevant  question  is whether  changes  in fam- 
ily composition  can explain  lackluster  poverty  reduction  in the 1980s  rel- 
ative to the 1960s. Table 3 suggests that these household-composition 
17. Ellwood  and Crane  (1990)  document  that these changes  in family  structure  have 
been much  more substantial  for blacks  than  for whites. David M. Cutler and Lawrence F. Katz  21 
trends  are unlikely  to be a primary  factor in explaining  patterns  in the 
1980s.  Most  of the change  in  family  structure  occurred  between 1969  and 
1979, with reinforcing,  but more moderate, changes in the 1960s and 
1980s. 
To evaluate  more  formally  the potential  effects of household-compo- 
sition  changes  on the aggregate  poverty  rate, we compare  changes  in ac- 
tual poverty rates with changes in fixed-weighted  poverty rates, con- 
structed  by taking  the poverty  rate  for each family  type in each year and 
weighting  it by the average share of the population  in that family type 
over the entire period. To the extent that family-structure  changes re- 
spond  to changes  in income, adjusting  poverty rates for these composi- 
tional effects may overstate their importance.  We thus treat the unad- 
justed and  adjusted  measures  of poverty  as bounds  on the importance  of 
compositional  change  in affecting  trends  in the aggregate  poverty rate. 
Because the poverty rates  published  by the U.S. government  are not 
revised to reflect  periodic  changes in the official  poverty definition  and 
because the official  poverty lines have been adjusted  for inflation  by a 
potentially  misleading  price  index, we construct  our own set of poverty 
rates using  a consistent  methodology  over time. Our  approach  involves 
making  two changes to the published  rates. First, official  poverty lines 
have changed  through  time in a way that increases poverty rates.  18  For 
example, poverty thresholds  before 1981  were lower for farm  than for 
nonfarm  families  and for female-headed  families  than  for all other  fami- 
lies. To adjust  for this, we recompute  poverty  rates  for our  sample  years 
with the family equivalence scale used after 1981.19  We scale the mea- 
sure of needs by that for a single person below the age of 65 who lives 
alone. The equivalence  scale then varies  along  three  dimensions:  the to- 
tal number  of persons  in the family;  the age of the household  head  (above 
or below age 65);  and the presence of related  children  below age 18. El- 
derly  household  heads  have a needs measure  about  8 percent  below that 
of nonelderly  household  heads. The poverty scale reflects  a high  degree 
of family  economies of scale. Relative  to the single, nonelderly  index of 
1.0, a two-adult,  nonelderly  family has a needs measure  of 1.29, and a 
two-adult,  one-child  family  has a needs measure  of 1.55. 
18. See Bureau  of the Census  (1991a,  pp. 354-56)  for  a description  of major  changes  in 
the official  poverty  definition. 
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Second, we update our poverty threshold using the personal con- 
sumption  expenditures  (PCE)  implicit  price  deflator  in place of the CPI. 
The CPI  includes  the purchase  price of new houses as one of its compo- 
nents, and, since the relative  price of houses increased  substantially  in 
the 1970s  and  consumers  do not purchase  new houses regularly,  the CPI 
consumption  basket  increased  faster  than  the price  of a typical  commod- 
ity bundle.  Our  alternative  index removes this price  disparity.20 
Table  4 shows the resulting  poverty rates for all persons and for per- 
sons in families  not headed  by an elderly  individual.  The table also pre- 
sents the poverty rates for different  types of households. Poverty rates 
for husband-wife  families  are generally  much lower than those for sin- 
gle-parent  families, particularly  female-headed  families. Almost half of 
the persons  in female-headed  families  with  children  have incomes  below 
the poverty  line. 
The table also shows the unadjusted  and adjusted  poverty rates. De- 
mographic  change has clearly had an important  effect on poverty rates 
over time. Poverty rates in 1963  would have been about 2 percentage 
points  greater  had  the demographic  makeup  in that  year  matched  the av- 
erage  over the period. Similarly,  poverty rates in 1989  would have been 
more than 1 percentage point lower without the intervening demo- 
graphic  change. The estimates for both the full sample and the nonel- 
derly sample  suggest  that  gains in the war on poverty have been under- 
stated  by about  2 to 3 percentage  points since 1963,  roughly  one-quarter 
to one-half  of the measured  poverty decline. 
The failure  of poverty rates to decline further  in the 1980s,  however, 
was not a consequence of demographic  change, nor was the rapid  de- 
cline in poverty  rates  in the 1960s  a result  of demographics.  Movements 
in the aggregate  unadjusted  and adjusted  poverty rates were similar  in 
the 1963-69  period  (7.3 versus 8.0 percent)  and the 1983-89  period  (2.6 
versus 2.2 percent). The same is true for the nonelderly  poverty rate. 
The greatest difference  between the unadjusted  and adjusted  poverty 
trends  is in the 1970s.  The unadjusted  poverty measures  show a 1.6 per- 
centage point decline in the total poverty rate from 1969  to 1979,  and a 
0.4 percentage  point decline in poverty among  the nonelderly.  The ad- 
justed figures  suggest declines of 3.7 and 2.3 percentage  points respec- 
tively. Thus, to the extent that changes in family structure  are exoge- 
nous, part of  the steadiness of poverty rates in the  1970s can be 
20. We assume  the 1967  poverty  line accurately  measures  the poverty  threshold  and 
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Table  4. Poverty  and Family  Composition,  Selected  Years, 1963-89 
Poverty  rate (percent) 
Family type  1963  1969  1973  1979  1983  1989 
All persons by  family type 
Husband-wife  families 
With children  17.2  8.6  7.1  7.0  10.4  7.6 
Without  children  12.3  7.0  4.6  3.9  4.1  3.1 
Male-headed  families 
Single  34.3  24.8  18.9  15.4  18.0  14.6 
With  children  30.6  22.4  14.8  13.0  19.8  17.0 
Other  relatives  13.1  10.0  7.0  5.2  6.6  6.3 
Female-headed  families 
Single  51.3  38.8  29.7  24.8  23.1  20.3 
With children  58.2  48.3  46.3  41.3  48.3  43.8 
Other  relatives  18.7  14.6  9.1  9.1  11.9  8.0 
Overall 
Unadjusted  20.0  12.7  11.2  11.1  13.8  11.6 
Adjusted  22.1  14.1  11.5  10.4  13.1  10.5 
Nonelderly  persons by  family type 
Husband-wife  families 
With  children  16.7  8.3  6.7  6.8  10.3  7.6 
Without  children  8.4  3.8  3.4  2.7  3.8  2.7 
Male-headed  families 
Single  30.0  19.6  17.0  14.2  17.8  14.6 
With  children  28.5  19.3  12.3  11.9  19.0  17.4 
Other  relatives  11.3  8.3  6.9  4.8  6.1  6.6 
Female-headed  families 
Single  39.1  29.0  26.9  22.6  23.1  20.6 
With  children  58.4  48.5  46.9  41.7  48.7  44.6 
Other  relatives  13.0  11.6  7.7  9.0  12.7  8.8 
Overall 
Unadjusted  18.3  11.0  10.4  10.6  14.1  12.0 
Adjusted  20.0  12.3  10.8  10.0  13.2  10.7 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on data  from  the March  CPS. Poverty  rates  for all years  are computed  using 
the official  family  equivalence  scale after 1981  and are updated  using  the personal  consumption  expenditure  deflator 
in place  of the consumer  price  index.  The unadjusted  poverty  rate  is the total  poverty  rate  for  that  year.  The adjusted 
poverty  rate weights  poverty  for each family  type by the average  share  of persons  in that  family  for the six years 
indicated. 
explained  by these changes; changing  family structure,  however, does 
not appear  to explain  poverty trends  in the 1960s  or 1980s. 
We also explore  whether  the increase  in  family  income  inequality  doc- 
umented  earlier  is affected by adjustments  for family size. To examine 
this, we compare  the unadjusted  family  income shares  with  a measure  of 24  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1991 
family  income  divided  by the equivalence  scale  implicit  in the official  pov- 
erty threshold.  We term  this measure  adjustedfamily  income.2'  Table  5 
shows the distribution  of unadjusted  and  adjusted  family  income  for  per- 
sons in nonelderly  families.  These data  show  that  family  composition  has 
played a relatively  minor  role in the changing  income distribution:  the 
family-size adjustment  reduces some of the perceived equality in the 
1960s,  but there  is very little adjustment  in the 1980s.  Using both meas- 
ures, family  income  inequality  increased  substantially  in the early 1980s 
but displays virtually  no trend  thereafter.  This is in marked  contrast  to 
the substantial  increase  in  the  relative  income  of the  poor  in  the  expansion 
of the 1960s, which was found using both unadjusted  and adjusted  in- 
come. Furthermore,  during  the 1980s  family  income  inequality  expanded 
within  each of the family  types listed  in table  3. 
Wage and Nonwage  Income  Inequality 
Much  recent work has documented  substantial  increases  in wage in- 
equality among both males and females during the 1980s.22 Annual, 
weekly, and hourly  earnings  inequality  all increased  for males from  the 
late 1970s  to the late 1980s.23  The log wage differential  between workers 
at the 90th  and 10th  percentiles  of the male  weekly wage distribution  in- 
creased by 18 percent from 1979  to 1988  as the real weekly wages of 
workers  at the 90th  percentile  rose by 5 percent  and the wages of those 
at the 10th  percentile  fell by 12  percent.24 
The wage distribution  widened  along  three  primary  dimensions  in the 
1980s.  First, education  differentials  increased  substantially,  particularly 
for younger  workers. From 1979  to the late 1980s,  the weekly earnings 
of young  male  college graduates  (those  with I to 10  years  of labor  market 
experience)  increased  by approximately  30 percent relative  to those of 
young  males  with 12  or  fewer years  of schooling.  Second, among  the less 
educated the average  wages of older workers  increased  relative to the 
21. A number  of authors  (Lazear  and Michael, 1988;  Van der Gaag  and Smolensky, 
1982)  have  argued  that  the official  equivalence  scales  do not  accurately  reflect  family  econ- 
omies  of scale. We  have experimented  with  a variety  of alternative  equivalence  measures, 
including  a per  capita  measure,  with  similar  results. 
22. See Levy and Murnane  (1991)  for a comprehensive  survey of the literature  on 
changes  in U.S. earnings  inequality. 
23. Juhn,  Murphy,  and  Pierce  (1991);  Karoly  (1990). 
24. Karoly  (1990,  table  B.2). David M. Cutler and Lawrence F. Katz  25 
Table 5.  Distribution of Unadjusted and Adjusted Family Income, Nonelderly Families, 
Selected Years, 1963-89 
Percent 
Income quintile  1963  1969  1973  1979  1983  1989 
Unadjusted  family income 
First (lowest)  5.4  6.1  5.5  5.0  4.2  4.2 
Second  12.8  12.9  12.5  12.0  11.0  10.8 
Third  17.9  17.8  17.7  18.0  17.4  17.1 
Fourth  23.8  23.5  23.8  24.6  24.8  24.6 
Fifth (highest)  40.0  39.7  40.4  40.4  42.6  43.3 
Adjusted  family income 
First (lowest)  5.1  5.9  5.5  5.2  4.3  4.2 
Second  11.9  12.2  12.1  12.1  11.0  10.8 
Third  17.2  17.2  17.2  17.6  17.2  16.9 
Fourth  23.6  23.4  23.5  24.4  24.5  24.2 
Fifth (highest)  42.2  41.3  41.5  40.7  43.0  43.9 
Source:  AuLthors'  calculations  based  on  data from  the  March  CPS.  Families  headed  by  an  elderly  person  are 
excluded  from the  sample.  All  distributions  are weighted  using  person  weights.  Adjusted  family  income  is  family 
income  divided by the equivalence  scale  implicit in the federal poverty  thresholds  after  1981. 
wages of younger  workers.  Third,  earnings  inequality  increased  within 
narrowly  defined  demographic  and skill groups.25  The growth  in wage 
differentials  among  education  groups  represented  a break  from the de- 
clining  college wage premiums  of the 1970s.  The growth  of within-group 
wage  differentials  in the 1980s  appears  to continue  a pattern  begun  about 
1970. 
We assess whether  these increases  in wage inequality  can account  for 
observed  changes in the family  income distribution  in the 1980s.  An in- 
crease in the dispersion of the wages of primary  earners directly in- 
creases family income inequality. Increased wage inequality among 
household  heads may also have important  indirect  effects. First, to the 
extent that more than one person in the family works, movements of 
wages for primary  earners may be offset or reinforced  by the labor- 
supply  responses of other family members.  If income effects dominate 
family  labor-supply  decisions, one might  expect increased  market  labor 
supply by other family members  when the household head's earnings 
decline. Alternatively,  positive assortive mating  on earnings  capacity, 
25. See Blackburn,  Bloom,  and  Freeman  (1990),  Bound  and  Johnson  (1989),  Katz  and 
Murphy  (forthcoming),  and Murphy  and Welch (forthcoming)  for detailed  analyses of 
changes  in education  and experience  differentials.  Juhn,  Murphy,  and Pierce  (1991)  dis- 
cuss the rise in within-group  inequality. 26  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
Table 6.  Distribution of Adjusted Family Income by Source of Income, Nonelderly 
Families, Selected Years,  1963-89 
Percent 
Income quintile  1963  1969  1979  1989 
Earnings  of primary  earner 
First (lowest)  4.7  5.3  4.3  3.7 
Second  12.8  12.9  12.8  11.4 
Third  18.4  18.1  18.6  17.6 
Fourth  24.2  23.6  24.7  24.6 
Fifth (highest)  39.9  40.1  39.6  42.6 
Total  labor income 
First (lowest)  4.3  4.8  3.9  3.3 
Second  11.9  12.2  11.9  10.6 
Third  17.4  17.5  18.0  17.3 
Fourth  24.2  23.9  25.2  25.0 
Fifth (highest)  42.3  41.6  41.0  43.9 
Totalfamily income 
First (lowest)  5.1  5.9  5.2  4.2 
Second  11.9  12.2  12.1  10.8 
Third  17.2  17.2  17.6  16.9 
Fourth  23.6  23.4  24.4  24.2 
Fifth (highest)  42.2  41.3  40.7  43.9 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on  data from the  March CPS.  The  table  shows  the distribution of adjusted 
income  among quintiles of the nonelderly  population.  All distributions are weighted  using person  weights.  Families 
are classified  on the basis  of total adjusted family income.  Adjusted family income  is family income  divided by the 
equivalence  scale  implicit in the federal poverty  thresholds  after  1981. 
and other factors causing  positive correlation  in market  opportunities, 
may mean  that  income earned  by secondary  workers  actually  increases 
family income inequality  during  periods of a widening  wage structure. 
McKinley  Blackburn  and  David  Bloom, for example,  find  that  the corre- 
lation between husbands' and wives' earnings  increased from 1979  to 
1987, implying that changes in family inequality will be greater than 
changes  in male  earnings  alone.26  Second, because, as discussed  earlier, 
the share  of nonlabor  income in market-based  family  income increased 
in the 1980s,  we examine the importance  of labor  and nonlabor  income 
in explaining  increases  in family  income inequality. 
Table 6 presents evidence on the importance  of different  sources of 
earnings  in explaining  increased family income inequality. Given the 
disparity  between nonelderly  and  elderly  families,  we focus on the non- 
26. Blackburn  and  Bloom  (1991a). David  M. Cutler  and Lawrence  F. Katz  27 
Figure 6.  Components of Change in the Share of Family Income of the Lowest Quintile, 
Nonelderly Population, Selected Intervals,  1963-89 
Percentage  points 
jill  Primary-earner  income 
0.5  Total labor  income 




1963-69  1969-79  1979-89 
Source:  See table 6. 
elderly  population.  We define  primary-earner  income  for each family  as 
the total earnings  of the person with the maximum  earnings  in the fam- 
ily.27  We adjust  primary-earner  income  for family  composition  using  the 
family equivalence scale described  above. On average, primary-earner 
income is about  70 percent  of total family  income. 
The upper  panel of table 6 shows the distribution  of primary-earner 
income for 1963, 1969, 1979,  and 1989  using the quintiles  of the family 
income distribution.  There is a clear trend  toward  increased  inequality 
since the late 1960s, consistent with the evidence we have been dis- 
cussing. The lowest quintile  of the family  income  distribution  gained  0.6 
percentage  point from 1963  to 1969  because of changes in the distribu- 
tion of the earnings  of primary  earners.  Changes  in the labor  market  out- 
comes of primary  earners  worked  against  the lowest quintile  in the 1970s 
and 1980s,  even adjusting  for the change  in family  size. The effect of pri- 
mary earners  on the income share of the lowest quintile  is depicted in 
figure  6 (the first  set of bars). 
To examine the role of secondary  earners  in changing  the family in- 
come distribution,  table 6 also shows the distribution  of total labor in- 
come, using the quintiles  of the family income distribution.  The differ- 
27. Total  earnings  equal  the sum  of wage  and  salary  income,  nonfarm  self-employment 
income,  and  farm  self-employment  income. 28  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1991 
ence between  the middle  panel  and  the upper  panel, then, is the effect of 
additional  earners  on the income distribution.  On average, this income 
accounts  for about  20 percent  of total  family  income. At any given point 
in time, income from secondary  workers  increases the disparity  of the 
income  distribution  relative  to that  disparity  generated  by primary  earn- 
ers alone. The share  of income  going  to the lowest quintile  of the income 
distribution  falls by about one-half  of one percentage  point when addi- 
tional  labor  income is included.  Accounting  for changes in the distribu- 
tion of this income, however, slightly  reduces the disparity  of changes 
in income between the 1960s  and 1980s.  The middle  set of bars in figure 
6 shows that changes in the distribution  of total earnings  reduced the 
shares  of the lowest quintile  in the 1960s  and 1970s  and had little effect 
on the distribution  of income in the 1980s. 
The final  panel of table 6 further  expands the measure  of income to 
totalfamily  income, a measure  similar  to that  used in table  5. The differ- 
ence between labor  income  and  family  income, about 10  percent  of fam- 
ily income, is predominantly  transfers  and capital  income. Accounting 
for nonlabor  income reduces the inequality  of family  income generated 
by labor  income, reflecting  the importance  of transfers  in the lowest in- 
come levels. However, changes in the distribution  of nonlabor  income 
had  very different  effects. As the last set of comparisons  in figure  6 indi- 
cates, changes in nonlabor  income had large equalizing  effects in the 
1960s  and 1970s,  but then skewed toward  the higher  income groups in 
the 1980s.  These shifts reflect  a decline in transfer  payments  to the non- 
elderly relative to other nonlabor  income. The share of income to the 
poorest 20 percent  of the primary-earner  distribution  falls an additional 
0.4 percentage  point between 1979  and 1989  when nonlabor  income is 
taken  into account. 
Although secondary-earner  income and nonlabor  income are both 
important  in accounting  for increased  family  income inequality,  figure  6 
shows that the dominant  source of change in family income inequality 
has come from  shifts  in the distribution  of primary-earner  income. While 
increased  inequality  in labor  earnings  is thus  the most important  contrib- 
utor to increased  family income inequality  in the 1980s,  other research 
has shown  that  declines in transfer  payments  to families  at the lower end 
of the income distribution  have played a substantial  role in increasing 
poverty rates, particularly  for female-headed  households.28 
28. See, for example, Hanratty  and Blank (forthcoming)  and Mishel and Frankel 
(1991). David M. Cutler and Lawrence F. Katz  29 
Is Rising Inequality an Illusion? A Look at Consumption 
In the two previous sections on inequality  and material  hardship,  as 
in most work on the level and distribution  of economic well-being,  we 
have used readily  available  statistics  on money income. Measures  of in- 
equality and poverty based on pretax, post-transfer  income indicate 
substantial  changes in income inequality  and persistent  poverty in the 
United States during  the 1980s, a development  that represents  a sharp 
break from the postwar pattern. These changes are not solely due to 
compositional  shifts  in the structure  of families  or changes  in the form  of 
received income. Further,  other research  has shown that  the inequality 
of post-tax, pretransfer  income also increased  during  the 1980s,29  sug- 
gesting that changes in tax policy are not compensating  for the change 
in pretax income. Thus, if money income is a reasonable  proxy for ac- 
cess to material  resources, little progress  has been made in the war on 
poverty since the early 1970s. 
Various  objections  have been voiced, however, concerning  the use of 
poverty  measures  based  on annual  money  income. First, such measures 
may  fail to capture  income  received  through  in-kind  transfers,  a particu- 
larly important  problem  for the measurement  of poverty since families 
with low money incomes often receive a variety  of in-kind  transfers  in- 
cluding  food stamps, housing  assistance, and medicaid.  Many of these 
programs  expanded  rapidly  in the 1970s,  suggesting  that  official  poverty 
rates overstate  the level of and  exaggerate  the increases  in poverty  dur- 
ing  the 1970s.  Nevertheless, since such programs  did not expand  greatly 
during  the 1980s, our inferences  concerning  changes in poverty in the 
1980s  are  unlikely  to be affected  by imputing  a value to in-kind  transfers. 
A consistent poverty rate series that includes  estimates of the value of 
in-kind  income and  noncash  transfers  (including  food stamps  and hous- 
ing and medical  assistance) is available  for the 1979-87  period  and can 
be used to assess the importance  of this income.30  While  the official  pov- 
erty rate increased  by 1.7 percentage  points (from 11.7  to 13.4  percent) 
between 1979  and 1987,  the adjusted  rate increased  by a slightly  larger 
2.1 percentage  points  (from  8.9 to 11.0  percent). 
Second, it is well known that income underreporting  is a problem  in 
household  surveys, and some researchers  have speculated  that  families 
29. Gramlich,  Kasten,  and  Sammartino  (1990). 
30. McNeil  (1988). 30  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
have become increasingly  likely to underreport  income. Growth  in ille- 
gitimate income and means-tested transfers may have led to an in- 
creased underreporting  of income, particularly  among the disadvan- 
taged.31 
Furthermore,  economic  theory  does not provide  a strong  case for the 
use of annual  income  to assess economic  welfare.  The life-cycle-perma- 
nent-income  hypothesis strongly suggests that permanent  irncome  is a 
more accurate  gauge of economic welfare than is current  income. In- 
creases in the variance  of transitory  income shocks could lead to an in- 
crease in the variance  of reported  current  income with little change in 
the distribution  of permanent  economic status. If consumers  do follow 
the life-cycle-permanent-income  model, then consumption  provides a 
more accurate  picture  of permanent  income and material  welfare than 
does current  income. Changes  in relative  prices may also differentially 
affect the poor and nonpoor.  In this case, measures  of real income that 
use aggregate  deflators,  such as the CPI or PCE implicit  price deflator, 
may yield a distorted  picture  of changes in living standards  for groups 
whose consumption  baskets are different  from  the "aggregate"  bundles 
used in the deflators.  An increase  in the aggregate  price  level associated 
with  an increase  in the price  of necessities relative  to luxuries,  for exam- 
ple, will increase the level of "true  poverty"  compared  with the same 
aggregate  price increase  associated with a relative  increase  in the price 
of luxuries.  Finally, standard  income statistics  fail to capture  disparities 
in consumption  arising  from  differences  in financial  wealth, in stocks of 
consumer  durables,  and in access to credit. 
The use of income-based measures of inequality and poverty has 
come under  attack  by those who believe that  they inaccurately  measure 
economic inequality  and  material  hardship.  Jencks has presented  a col- 
lage of evidence indicating  that the decade of the 1970s  was a period  of 
"hidden  prosperity,"  with substantial  improvements  in average living 
standards  and  reductions  in the material  hardship  of the poor, neither  of 
which is captured  in income statistics. In addition, Mayer and Jencks 
present  survey  evidence  for a sample  of households  in Chicago,  showing 
31. Mayer  and  Jencks  (1991).  See Lillard  and  Smith  (1986)  for  a detailed  discussion  of 
income underreporting  in the Census of Population  and Current  Population  Survey. In 
fact, the Census Bureau  reports  that changes  in processing  have increased  the share  of 
aggregate  income  captured  by the CPS in recent years; see Bureau  of the Census  (1989, 
p. 16). David M. Cutler  and Lawrence  F. Katz  31 
that  income-based  indicators  of poverty  are  only weakly  correlated  with 
many "direct"  measures  of material  hardship.32  They argue  further  that 
examination  of other measures of living standards  (like crowding, the 
adequacy  of housing  conditions, and access to medical  care)  reveals no 
increase  in inequality  from  the early 1970s  to the mid-1980s.33  Dale Jor- 
genson, too, in a carefully  formulated  economic  framework,  has demon- 
strated  that  economic  welfare  is more  accurately  captured  by consump- 
tion than by income.34  In further  work, Daniel Slesnick has used this 
framework  to show that income-based  measures  provide "severely bi- 
ased"  measures  of the level and  trend  of U.S. poverty and  economic in- 
equality.35  This literature  suggests  that  increased  income inequality  and 
poverty  in the 1970s  and 1980s  may  reflect  the weak  link  between  income 
measures and actual material well-being, rather than a substantive 
change in the ability of the disadvantaged  to benefit  from general  eco- 
nomic  growth.  Thus, we now examine  changes  in the distribution  of con- 
sumption  using micro data from the Consumer  Expenditure  Surveys 
covering  the past thirty  years. 
The Consumer Expenditure Survey Data 
Household-level  data  on expenditures  and  income over the course of 
a year are available  in reasonably  consistent form for scattered dates 
over the past three decades from the Consumer  Expenditure  Surveys. 
The CES is a large-scale  household survey that attempts  to gather  de- 
tailed information  on the expenditure  patterns  of the typical household 
and is used to derive expenditure  weights  for the consumer  price index. 
In  the past, the CES had  been conducted  approximately  every ten years, 
starting  in the early 1900s  and ending in 1980. Since 1980, it has been 
conducted  on a continuous  basis.36 
We utilize public-use  micro  data  from  the CES for 1960-61, 1972-73, 
1980,  1984,  and 1988  to measure  changes  in the distribution  of consump- 
tion. The unit  of observation  in these surveys is what the Bureau  of La- 
32. Jencks  (1984);  Mayer  and  Jencks  (1989). 
33. Mayer  and Jencks  (1991). 
34. Jorgenson  (1990). 
35. Slesnick  (1991c,  1991d). 
36. See Jacobs  and Shipp  (1990)  for a discussion  of the historical  evolution  of the ex- 
penditure  survey  methodology. 32  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1991 
bor Statistics (BLS) calls a consumer  unit. A consumer  unit is a group 
of individuals  who live in the same household  and either are related  or 
share in at least two of the three major  expense categories: housing, 
food, and  other  living  expenses.37  Our  goal in the design  of samples  and 
the construction  of consumption  measures has been to make them as 
comparable  over time  as possible. Since the information  provided  by the 
CES has changed  over time, the goal has necessitated  discarding  poten- 
tially  useful  information  that  is available  in some years  but  not in others. 
A detailed  description  of our sample-selection  criteria  and  the construc- 
tion of key variables  is presented  in the appendix. 
We examine  two basic measures  of consumption.  The first,  which  we 
denote as total expenditures,  is the direct measure of total consumer 
spending  over the course of a year. Total  expenditures  include  all direct 
out-of-pocket  expenditures  made by consumer  units. These include all 
direct purchases  of goods and services, insurance  payments  (including 
employee social security  and  retirement  contributions),  and  cash contri- 
butions. Indirect  purchases such as employer-provided  health and life 
insurance  benefits  are not included. 
As a measure  of economic consumption,  total expenditures  presents 
several  problems.  Possibly the most important  problem  is the treatment 
of consumer  durables.  All current  out-of-pocket  expenditures  on con- 
sumer  durables,  including  purchases  of new and  used durable  goods, are 
included  as current  consumption  expenditures  in the CES. Current  out- 
of-pocket expenditures may therefore provide an inaccurate picture 
of the service flow provided  by a consumer unit's stock of consumer 
durables.  The most important  expenditure  items  for which  this difficulty 
exists are housing  and  motor  vehicles. Total  expenditures  include  mort- 
gage payments for homeowners with mortgages  but exclude the con- 
sumption  value of the house for those consumer units without mort- 
gages. This measure  is likely to be particularly  misleading  for consumer 
units  who have no mortgage  or who are close to owning  their  house out- 
right,  such as the elderly. Similarly,  spending  on new automobiles  is in- 
cluded  in expenditures,  but the consumption  value of the existing stock 
is not. 
A second potential  difficulty  with the use of total expenditures  as a 
consumption  measure is that expenditures  on insurance-particularly 
37. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (1985,  p. 131). David M. Cutler  and Lawrence  F. Katz  33 
life insurance  payments, employee social security contributions,  and 
other pension contributions-are treated as part of current  consumer 
expenditures. Many of these payments can be viewed conceptually, 
however, as  savings or tax payments rather than as  current con- 
sumption. 
These difficulties  with total expenditures  as a measure  of economic 
resources  motivate  our  use of a second consumption  measure,  which  we 
denote total consumption.  Total consumption  is formed  from total ex- 
penditures  in two steps. We first subtract  spending  on insurance,  pen- 
sions, and social security. The second adjustment  to consumption  is to 
exclude spending  on the two largest  categories  of consumer  durables- 
owned homes and  new and  used vehicles-and  to impute  a rental  equiv- 
alence for each. For the homeowner  adjustment,  we subtract  payments 
of mortgage  principal  and interest from consumption  and add a rental 
equivalence  measure  imputed  from  self-reported  data  on market  values; 
the appendix  describes the procedure  in detail. For the vehicle adjust- 
ment, we exclude spending  on new and used vehicles and  include  an es- 
timate of the consumption  value of the stock of existing vehicles. The 
consumption  value is the predicted  purchase  price of a new vehicle for 
each household times the number  of existing vehicles the household 
owns, times an assumed annual  rate of depreciation  (one-eighth  of the 
value each year). The appendix  also describes this adjustment  in more 
detail.38 
A potentially  important  issue concerning  the CES data  is the possibil- 
ity of systematic  changes over time in the level of underreporting  of in- 
come and expenditure.  The emphasis  in CES interviews  is on gathering 
expenditure  information  rather  than on gathering  detailed information 
on sources of income. The expenditure  data  are generally  believed to be 
of higher  quality  than  the income information  in the CES. We compare 
CES and CPS income data in the appendix  and conclude that CES data 
closely approximate  CPS data in 1972-73 but that income underre- 
porting in the CES relative to the CPS increased substantially  in the 
1980s. Comparisons  of CES expenditure  data with NIA data on con- 
sumer expenditures also suggest a possible deterioration  in CES re- 
38. Slesnick  (1991a)  adjusts  consumption  for additional  durable  goods items beyond 
housing  and  vehicles. Since housing  and  vehicles are the largest  durable  components  and 
since the most complete  data  exist for these categories,  we adjust  only for these two com- 
ponents. 34  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1991 
porting  from the 1970s  to the early 1980s.39  The CES sampling  frame- 
work  and survey  methodology  are much  more  consistent  over the 1980s 
than  they are between the widely separated  earlier  surveys. 
One final  issue that arises with  data  on consumer  units is that  the size 
of consumer  units has declined  over the course of the surveys. As with 
our  income  measures  in the previous  section, we report  results  using  the 
household equivalence scale implicit  in the federal poverty level. We 
have examined  a variety  of different  equivalence scales, however, and 
found that our qualitative  results are not very sensitive to assumptions 
about household  economies of scale or assumptions  about the relative 
needs of children  and  adults.40 
In conclusion, the problems  with income data in the CES lead us to 
use income data from the CPS as our primary  measure of income in- 
equality.  For consumption  measures,  although  one must be cautious in 
interpreting  changes in consumption  levels because of the potential  de- 
terioration  in survey  quality,  the CES provides  the only reasonably  con- 
sistent data  to examine  changes in the distribution  of consumption  over 
time. 
Income,  Expenditures,  and Consumption  in Cross Section 
We first examine differences  in the distribution  of income, total ex- 
penditures, and total consumption at a single point in time. Table 7 
shows statistics  on the 1988  levels and distribu-  tion of income, expendi- 
tures, and consumption  using both CES and CPS measures. The top 
panel  of the table  displays  the mean  per  capita  levels of each variable  for 
the entire sample and for children  (persons below age 18), adults (per- 
sons aged 18  to 64), and  the elderly  (persons  age 65 and  over). We do not 
attempt  to apportion  income or consumption  across the family mem- 
bers. Thus, the income of a child, for example, is total consumer unit 
income divided by the number of persons in that consumer unit or 
family. 
The bottom  panel  of the table shows the distribution  of each variable 
39. Bosworth,  Burtless,  and  Sabelhaus  (1991);  Sabelhaus  (1990);  Slesnick  (1991b). 
40. By contrast, Slesnick (1991c, 1991d)  finds that trends  in poverty and inequality 
measures  may be quite sensitive to the choice of equivalence  scale when one allows the 
needs of consumer  units  to depend  on the race, sex, and  age of the household  head  as well 
as on the region  of residence  and  type of residence  (farm  or nonfarm). David M. Cutler and Lawrence F. Katz  35 
Table  7. Distribution  of Income,  Expenditures,  and Consumption,  per Capita, 1988 
CES 
CPS  Total  Total 
pretax  Pretax  Adjusted  expendi-  consump- 
Income group  income  income  incomea  tures  tion 
Mean amounts  (1988  dollars) 
All  12,908  11,379  14,341  9,788  9,402 
Adults  14,824  13,189  16,420  11,053  10,324 
Elderly  12,790  10,447  14,531  9,862  11,594 
Children  8,429  7,744  9,589  6,915  6,330 
Distribution  by decile (percent) 
First (lowest)  1.1  1.3  1.4  2.0  2.2 
Second  3.0  2.9  3.0  3.6  4.0 
Third  4.4  4.2  4.5  5.0  5.4 
Fourth  5.7  5.5  5.9  6.1  6.7 
Fifth  7.1  6.9  7.4  7.3  7.9 
Sixth  8.6  8.5  8.8  8.7  9.2 
Seventh  10.5  10.4  10.6  10.4  10.8 
Eighth  13.0  12.9  13.0  12.6  12.7 
Ninth  17.0  17.0  16.6  16.2  15.8 
Tenth (highest)  29.6  30.3  28.8  28.2  25.3 
Gini coefficient  .423  .427  .408  .384  .348 
Sources: Authors'  calculations  based  on data  from  the 1988  Consumer  Expenditure  Survey  (CES)  and  the March 
1989  CPS. Mean  amounts  are weighted  by the number  of persons  in each group.  Children  are persons  less than 18 
years  old; adults  are aged 18-64;  elderly  are aged  65 and  above.  Decile  distributions  are  sorted  by the variable  whose 
shares  are reported. 
a. Adjusted  income  is pretax  income  plus the rental  equivalence  of owner-occupied  housing  and  owned  vehicles. 
for the entire population.  Here, we treat each variable separately, so 
that, for example,  the shares  of income are for families  in each decile of 
the income  distribution  and  the shares  of expenditures  are  for consumer 
units  in each decile of the expenditure  distribution.  We also present  Gini 
coefficients  to summarize  the degree  of inequality  in the distributions  for 
each variable. 
The first column of the table provides information  on per capita in- 
come from the CPS; the second column provides similar  information 
from the CES. Both columns indicate  that mean income is highest for 
nonelderly adults and lowest for children. The substantial underre- 
porting  of income  in the CES relative  to the CPS  in 1988  is also apparent 
from the two columns. The distributions  of income are fairly similar  in 
the two surveys, however. If underreporting  of income and consump- 
tion is similar,  our distributions  of both variables  across subgroups  will 
be correct  even if the levels are not. 36  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
The third column displays "adjusted"  income from the CES. Ad- 
justed income  adds  imputed  rental  income  from  owned houses and  vehi- 
cles to pretax  money income. These income imputations  raise the rela- 
tive income of the elderly and reduce dispersion  in the overall income 
distribution.  Although  the Gini  coefficient  falls fairly  substantially  using 
this measure, most of the changes are due to increased income in the 
middle  deciles and away from the upper  deciles. The share  of adjusted 
income received by the poorest quintile  is similar  to the share without 
the income  adjustment. 
The fourth  column of table 7 reports total expenditures  per capita. 
Mean  expenditures  are much  more equal across groups  than are any of 
the income measures. The data reflect positive savings for all ages, 
though  the differential  between income and  expenditures  is smallest  for 
the elderly. 
The final column examines the distribution  of total consumption. 
There is a striking  difference between the elderly and the nonelderly 
when comparing  expenditure  and  consumption,  with a much  higher  liv- 
ing standard  for the elderly using the total consumption  measure. The 
average  difference  between the consumption  and expenditure  of the el- 
derly  is $1,732  (17.5  percent  of expenditures);  by contrast,  consumption 
is somewhat  lower than expenditure  for the nonelderly.  The principal 
reasons  for these differences  between the elderly  and  nonelderly  are the 
housing  and  insurance  adjustments.  Since many  of the elderly  own their 
own homes, often without  mortgages,  elderly consumption  is dramati- 
cally increased  by our rental  imputation.  For the nonelderly,  however, 
the housing adjustment  raises the mean by a small amount  ($361);  the 
adjustment  for vehicles has almost  no effect on the mean;  and  the exclu- 
sion of insurance  payments  (predominantly  employee contributions  for 
social security) substantially  reduces the mean. These insurance  pay- 
ments and  taxes averaged  $1,066  per capita  for the nonelderly  in 1988. 
The lower panel of table 7 also shows substantial  differences  in the 
distributions  of income, expenditure,  and consumption.  The distribu- 
tion of expenditures  is clearly more equal than the distribution  of in- 
come, and consumption  is even more equally  distributed  than expendi- 
tures. While  the lowest quintile  of the income  distribution  received only 
4.1 percent  of total money income in 1988,  the lowest quintile  of the ex- 
penditure  distribution  accounted for 5.6 percent of total expenditures 
and  the lowest quintile  of the consumption  distribution  accounted  for  6.2 David  M. Cutler  and Lawrence  F. Katz  37 
percent  of total consumption.  The smaller  degree of dispersion  in con- 
sumption  than  in expenditures  and  in expenditures  than  in income  is also 
true within  all the age groups. All three of the adjustments  to total ex- 
penditures  used to form  total consumption  contribute  to the 9.4 percent 
decline in the Gini coefficient  between the expenditures  and consump- 
tion measure. 
The Distribution  of Income  and Consumption,  1960-88 
The distributions  of income, total expenditures,  and total consump- 
tion differ substantially  in any year, as predicted  by the life-cycle-per- 
manent-income  hypothesis. But this finding  does not necessarily  imply 
that secular changes in the distribution  of current income are a mis- 
leading  measure  of changes in material  well-being.  To examine this is- 
sue, we compare  changes  in the distributions  of adjusted  family  income, 
consumption,  and  expenditures  across the past thirty  years. The adjust- 
ments in this case use the family equivalence scales in the federal  pov- 
erty measure. 
Tables 8 and 9 present  information  on changes in the distribution  of 
pretax, post-transfer  money income and total expenditures  per equiva- 
lent person over the past thirty years from the CPS (table 8) and CES 
(table 9).41  Information  for all individuals is presented in the upper 
panels  of each table and  for those living  in nonelderly  households  in the 
lower panels. 
The two tables reveal similar  patterns  of change  in the distribution  of 
income  and  expenditures.  Table  8 reiterates  the basic  facts on decreased 
income inequality  in the 1960s  and increased inequality  since that pe- 
riod. Table  9 shows that  these patterns  are  as true  for expenditure-based 
measures  of inequality  as they are for income-based  measures.  For the 
poor, expenditures  per equivalent  person grew in the 1960s  expansion, 
both  in absolute  terms  and  as a share  of total  expenditures.  The expendi- 
ture  distribution  widened  during  the 1980s,  however. The share  of total 
expenditures  going to the lowest quintile  declined from 7.5 percent to 
6.5 percent  between 1980  and 1984,  reflecting  the severe recession  of the 
41. We summarize  changes  in the income, expenditures,  and consumption  distribu- 
tions  by reporting  decile shares  and  mean  levels within  deciles. Our  qualitative  results  are 
similar  if we examine  levels of each variable  at each percentile.  Our  results  are not driven 
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early 1980s.  What  is more noticeable, however, is the further  slight  de- 
cline in the share  of total expenditures  going  to the bottom  quintile  dur- 
ing  the robust  macroeconomic  recovery  of 1984-88.  Thus, using  both  in- 
come and  expenditure  measures,  we find  the share  of resources  going  to 
the poor did not increase as the macroeconomy  boomed. Overall, ex- 
penditures  and income both indicate  increased  inequality  and material 
hardship  in the 1980s. 
The breakdown  in the relationship  between macroeconomic  perfor- 
mance  and  the disadvantaged,  we have already  shown, holds largely  for 
working-age  families. The lower panels of tables 8 and 9, therefore,  re- 
port  changes  in income  and  expenditures  among  nonelderly  households. 
Among  this group,  the pattern  of rising  inequality  in income and expen- 
ditures  in the 1980s  is even more striking.  The share of total expendi- 
tures going to the bottom decile declined by more than one-fifth  from 
1980  to 1988. 
Given  the problems  with  total  expenditures  as a measure  of economic 
consumption,  table 10  examines  changes  in the distribution  of total con- 
sumption.  A comparison  of table 10  with table  9 highlights  the similarity 
of the changes  in the distribution  of the two variables.  Consumption  in- 
equality was greatly reduced from the early 1960s  to the early 1970s, 
along with expenditure  inequality,  and then increased  in the 1970s  and 
1980s.  Although  the increase in inequality  is slightly moderated  in the 
consumption  distribution,  it is still substantial.  Further,  the expansion 
from 1984  to 1988  does not appear  to have reduced  consumption  inequal- 
ity at all. 
Jorgenson  and Slesnick both raise the possibility that relative price 
changes  may have important  effects on the poor relative  to the rich.42  In 
this case, our total consumption  measure may provide an inaccurate 
guide to changes in the actual consumption  of different  groups of the 
population.  To explore this issue, we have constructed  an alternative 
consumption  measure  in which we break  down total consumption  into 
12  major  expenditure  categories  and  use the consumer  price  indexes for 
specific  expenditure  classes to convert  expenditures  into 1988  dollars.4 
42. Jorgenson  (1990);  Slesnick(1991a,  1991d). 
43. The 12  categories  used are food and  alcohol;  apparel;  shelter;  fuels, utilities,  and 
public  services;  household  operations;  house furnishings  and  equipment;  vehicles; other 
transportation  expenses; health care; entertainment;  cash contributions;  and all other 
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We refer  to this variable  as component-deflated  consumption.  Table 11 
presents  changes  in the level and  distribution  of our  component-deflated 
consumption  measure.  The table indicates  that the pattern  observed in 
the previous tables in this section remains  essentially unchanged  when 
one takes into account relative price changes.44  Inequality  in compo- 
nent-deflated  consumption  decreased  in the 1960s  and expanded  during 
the 1980s. 
To avoid the imputations  inherent  in our measure, we have also ex- 
amined  a measure  of nondurable  consumption,  excluding  housing  costs, 
new vehicle purchases,  insurance  payments,  and spending  on major  ap- 
pliances. Our findings  concerning  changes in the distribution  of con- 
sumption  over time  are  quite  similar  to those reported  in tables  9, 10,  and 
11  when we use this measure  of consumption  of nondurables.  Increased 
consumption  inequality  in the 1980s  is not driven  by our  imputations  for 
durables. 
Can Income  Still Measure  Economic  Well-Being? 
Trends  in consumption  across deciles have mirrored  trends  in income 
throughout  the post-1960  period.  That  evidence does not address  the re- 
lation between income and consumption  at the micro level, however. 
One argument  against using income measures to determine poverty 
rates, for example, is that  for any given family, current  income is a mis- 
leading  indicator  of true  economic status.  James  Poterba  finds,  using  the 
1985  CES, that 15 percent of the consumer  units in the lowest income 
decile are above the third  expenditure  decile, as are 28 percent of the 
consumer  units  in the second income decile.45 
To examine whether  the relation  between income and consumption 
has deteriorated  over time, we consider  the correlation  between  the two 
penditures,  with the exception  of cash contributions,  where  we use the overall  CPI. The 
indexes  used are from the Economic Report of the President 1991, tables B-59 and B-60. 
For 1960-61  and 1972-73,  the deflation  is necessarily  inexact, since the definition  of con- 
sumption  categories  has changed  over time. We attempt  to produce  the same  groups  in all 
years, however,  using  the concordances  in Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (1978,  1985). 
44. Slesnick (1991c, 1991d)  similarly  finds that taking into account relative price 
changes  has little  effect on inferences  concerning  changes  in poverty  and  inequality. 
45. Poterba  (1991). David M. Cutler and Lawrence F. Katz  43 
Table 11.  Distribution of Component-deflated Consumption for Nonelderly 
Consumer Units, CES Data, Selected Years,  1960-88 
Consumption decile  1960-61  1972-73  1980  1984  1988 
Mean  consumption per equivalent person  (1988 dollars) 
First (lowest)  3,594  4,991  4,719  4,048  4,201 
Second  5,960  7,753  7,616  7,303  7,230 
Third  7,575  9,467  9,676  9,543  9,542 
Fourth  8,883  10,851  11,280  11,437  11,413 
Fifth  10,084  12,225  12,918  13,027  13,332 
Sixth  11,362  13,549  14,539  14,732  15,293 
Seventh  12,759  15,076  16,253  16,691  17,366 
Eighth  14,523  16,971  18,398  19,296  20,126 
Ninth  17,167  19,782  21,568  23,111  24,143 
Tenth (highest)  24,832  27,267  31,274  34,040  35,408 
Total  11,674  13,835  14,824  15,333  15,816 
Gini coefficient  .  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Share of total consumption 
First (lowest)  3.1  3.6  3.2  2.6  2.6 
Second  5.1  5.6  5.1  4.8  4.6 
Third  6.5  6.9  6.5  6.2  6.0 
Fourth  7.6  7.8  7.6  7.5  7.2 
Fifth  8.6  8.8  8.7  8.5  8.4 
Sixth  9.7  9.8  9.8  9.3  9.8 
Seventh  10.9  10.9  11.0  11.2  11.0 
Eighth  12.4  12.3  12.4  12.6  12.7 
Ninth  14.7  14.3  14.6  15.1  15.2 
Tenth (highest)  21.3  20.0  21.1  22.2  22.5 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Gini coefficient  .277  .250  .273  .297  .304 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on data  from  the CES. The table  shows  the distribution  of consumption  with 
the components  individually  deflated  to 1988  dollars.  See the appendix  for details.  The consumption  per  equivalent 
person  for a consumer  unit is total deflated  consumption  divided  by the equivalence  scale implicit  in the official 
poverty  thresholds  after  1981.  Distributions  are  for  individuals,  with  each  consumer  unit  weighted  by its CES  sampling 
weight  times  the total  number  of individuals  in the unit.  The nonelderly  sample  consists  of all individuals  in consumer 
units  where  the reference  person  is below  65 years  of age. 
in a series  -of cross sections, using the data in our CES surveys.46  If in- 
come has deteriorated  as a measure  of economic  resources, the correla- 
tion between income and consumption  should decline in the later sur- 
veys relative  to earlier  ones. 
46. An alternative  approach  to this  issue, which  we do not pursue,  involves  estimating 
consumption  functions  at the individual  level. Substantial  recent research  has shown, 
however,  that  only very restrictive  sets of preferences  will lead to consumption  functions 
that  can  be estimated  at the individual  level. See Hall  (1990)  for more  discussion.  We thus 
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Table 12.  Correlation of Income with Consumption and Expenditures, 
Selected Years, 1960-88 
Correlation  coefficient 
Unadjusted  Adjusted 
Year  Expenditures  Consumption  Expenditures  Consumption 
1960-61  0.889  0.874  0.867  0.848 
1972-73  0.820  0.805  0.758  0.732 
1980  0.741  0.720  0.680  0.647 
1984  0.755  0.733  0.714  0.685 
1988  0.759  0.743  0.718  0.692 
Source:  Authors' calculations  based on data from the CES. The table shows  the correlation between  the logarithm 
of income  and the logarithm of consumption  or expenditures  for various years.  Adjusted figures are divided  by the 
equivalence  scale implicit in the official poverty thresholds  after 1981. 
Table 12 shows the correlation  between the logarithm  of income and 
the logarithm  of our  two consumption  measures  for each of the CES sur- 
veys.47  The table suggests  two contrasting  conclusions. First, there is a 
decline  in the predictive  power of income in the later  surveys  relative  to 
the previous  ones. Using the adjusted  measure  of total  consumption,  for 
example, the correlation  between income and consumption declined 
from 0.848 in 1960-61,  to 0.732 in 1972-73, to about  0.690 in the 1980s. 
Since the quality of the CES appears  comparable  in the 1960-61 and 
1972-73  periods, this suggests  at least some decline in the extent of ma- 
terial  hardship  that  is conveyed by changes  in income. Because the qual- 
ity of the CES data  fell dramatically  in the 1980s,  however, it is difficult 
to determine  whether  the reduced  correlation  between 1972-73  and the 
1980s  results from less information  about economic hardship  in the in- 
come numbers  or from  increased  measurement  error. 
The second conclusion  from table 12 is that the correlation  between 
income and consumption  did not decline in the 1980s,  the period  of the 
most dramatic  changes in the income (and consumption)  distributions. 
For all four measures  of consumption,  the correlation  between income 
and consumption  increases throughout  the 1980s. At a minimum,  this 
suggests  that  the trends  in income  inequality  within  the 1980s  are  having 
a greater  effect on consumption  over time. 
47. The small  number  of consumer  units  that  report  nonpositive  values  of income  and 
total  consumption  is dropped  from  the samples  used for estimating  the correlation  coeffi- 
cients. The  basic  pattern  of findings  in table  12  is almost  identical  when  these observations 
are  retained  and  correlations  of the level of income  and  consumption  are  examined. David M. Cutler and Lawrence F. Katz  45 
Figure 7.  Changes in Mean Consumption per Capita and Income per Capita 
by Demographic Group, 1980-88 
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Source:  Authors' calculations based on data from the CES. Data for 32 demographic groups are used (two genders, 
four  age groups,  and  four  education  groups). 
As an alternative  to the micro estimates of the income-consumption 
correlation,  we also examined the correlation  between income move- 
ments and  consumption  movements  for various  demographic  groups. If 
large changes in family income across the gender, age, and education 
groups  of the population  documented  earlier  reflect true changes in re- 
sources, they should  predict  changes in consumption  as well. Figure  7 
shows the change in per capita  consumption  and income between 1980 
and 1988  for 32 demographic  groups  (two genders,  four age groups,  and 
four education  groups).  The estimated  correlation  between movements 
in income and consumption  for these groups  is 0.78. We conclude that 
income  differences  across demographic  groups  are  almost  fully  reflected 
in movements  in consumption. 
In summary,  we conclude that income, expenditures,  and consump- 
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Table 13. Income  and Consumption  Poverty  Rates, Selected  Years, 1960-88 
Percent 
Population  group  1960-61  1963  1972-73  1980  1984  1988 
Poverty  rates  from CPS (income) 
All  ...  20.0  11.6  11.9  12.6  12.0 
Adults  ...  15.2  8.7  9.2  10.3  9.6 
Elderly  ...  32.6  17.3  13.6  10.0  10.2 
Children  . . .  23.5  15.0  16.9  19.1  18.3 
Young families  .  .  18.9  11.0  13.3  15.6  15.6 
Nonelderly  households  . ..  17.6  10.7  11.6  13.0  12.2 
Poverty  rates  from CES (consumption) 
All  13.0  ...  6.2  7.5  8.7  8.6 
Adults  9.5  ...  4.8  6.0  7.2  6.7 
Elderly  13.6  ...  7.0  6.2  5.4  3.8 
Children  17.9  ...  8.9  11.1  13.5  15.2 
Young  families  10.2  . . .  6.0  5.4  8.4  8.8 
Nonelderly  households  12.8  ...  6.1  7.6  9.3  9.3 
Sources: Authors'  calculations  based  on data  from  the March  CPS  and  the CES.  Poverty  rates  are  calculated  using 
pretax,  post-transfer  income,  and  total  consumption  and  use the poverty  thresholds  after  1981.  The  poverty  threshold 
is updated  using  the personal  consumption  expenditure  deflator  in place of the consumer  price index. All poverty 
rates  are for individuals.  Adults  are aged 18-64;  the elderly  are those above age 65; and  children  are below age 18. 
Young  families  are individuals  living  in families  with heads aged 25 to 34. Nonelderly  households  are households 
whose head  is below age 65. 
welfare  in the 1980s.  Standard  income-based  inequality  measures  do not 
seem to be a misleading  guide to changes in the distribution  of perma- 
nent income. All measures  indicate  a substantial  rise in inequality  in the 
recession of the early 1980s  and essentially no reversal of this pattern 
since. 
Table 13 summarizes  our results on income and consumption  distri- 
butions, showing trends in poverty rates using the two measures. The 
top part  of the table shows income-based  measures  of poverty for vari- 
ous demographic  groups  from  the CPS. The bottom  part  of the table  pre- 
sents analogous  poverty measures using total consumption  data from 
the CES.48  While  consumption  poverty rates are below income  poverty 
rates in every year, the time series patterns  for the two measures are 
quite similar.  Both income  and  consumption  poverty  rates  declined  dra- 
48. Some caution  is necessary  in interpreting  changes  in poverty  levels in the CES be- 
cause of changes  in the survey  methodology  between  the two earlier  surveys  and  the sur- 
veys from  the 1980s.  The  overall  increase  in consumption  poverty  from  the 1972-73  period 
to the 1980s  is probably  somewhat  overstated  because  of the decline  in the  fraction  of total 
consumption  expenditures  captured  by the survey. David M. Cutler  and  Lawrence  F. Katz  47 
matically  for all groups from the early 1960s  to 1972-73. The poverty 
rate of the elderly has declined relative to the nonelderly  under both 
measures.  Children  and  individuals  in young  families  (those with house- 
hold  heads  between  25 and  34  years  of age)  have had  the most substantial 
increases in both income and consumption poverty over the past 
decade. 
Who Was Left Behind in the 1980s? 
Standard  analyses  of the welfare  of the poor have stressed  two bene- 
fits of macroeconomic  expansion. First, the increase  in labor  demand  in 
an expansion creates additional  jobs for the unemployed, benefiting 
those with  lower  income. Second, the nature  ofjobs for existing  workers 
changes, so that  low-wage  workers  are able to obtain  higher-paying  jobs 
than  they had  in recessions. As Arthur  Okun  wrote in Brookings  Papers 
nearly  20 years ago, "a  high-pressure  economy generates  not only more 
jobs than  does a slack economy, but also a different  pattern  of employ- 
ment. It suggests that, in a weak labor market,  a poor  job is often the 
best  job available,  superior  at least to the alternative  of no  job. A high- 
pressure  economy  provides  people  with  a chance  to climb  ladders  to bet- 
ter  jobs."49 
Okun  considered  two explanations  for this skill upgrading.  The first 
was that  in an expansion,  wages of highly  skilled  workers  rose more  rap- 
idly than wages of less skilled workers, leading  firms  to substitute  the 
less skilled for the higher skilled. The second explanation, similar  to 
more recent dual-labor-market  models, was that some firms  pay high 
wages to reduce  turnover  and  improve  the morale  of their  workers,  and, 
in an expansion, these firms  increased employment  by hiring  workers 
from  the low-wage  sector. Okun  rejected  the first  explanation  in favor  of 
the second, citing the narrowing  of wages in an expansion  as evidence 
against simple demand  substitution.  All told, Okun  calculated  that the 
upgrading  of workers  across industries  accounted  for about 30 percent 
of increased  wage payments  in an expansion.50 
49. Okun  (1973,  p. 234). Also see Akerlof,  Rose, and Yellen (1988)  for a comprehen- 
sive recent  analysis  of the process  of cyclical  upgrading. 
50. Okun  (1973,  p. 235). 48  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
Table 14.  The Effect of the Expansions of the 1960s and 1980s 
on the Income Distribution 
1988 dollars, unless  otherwise  noted 
1960s  1980s 
Annual  Annual 
change  change 
Poplulation  group  1963  1969  (per-cent)  1983  1989  (per-cent) 
Sex of family head 
Male  11,707  15,421  4.6  18,520  20,631  1.8 
Female  5,901  7,553  4.1  10,380  11,784  2.1 
Age of family head 
Below 25  8,561  11,726  5.2  9,568  9,834  0.5 
25-34  10,413  13,900  4.8  14,689  15,904  1.3 
35-44  11,044  14,212  4.2  17,548  19,889  2.1 
45-54  13,778  17,825  4.3  21,300  24,534  2.4 
55-64  14,059  18,156  4.3  20,629  22,383  1.4 
65 and above  8,131  9,927  3.3  13,885  15,294  1.6 
Education  offamily head 
Less than  high school  8,984  11,055  3.5  10,345  10,309  -0.1 
High  school  12,068  15,268  3.9  16,011  17,250  1.2 
Some college  13,925  17,361  3.7  18,652  20,802  1.8 
College  or more  17,077  22,053  4.3  26,546  30,269  2.2 
Head of younig  family, 
aged 25-34 
High school  10,824  13,864  4.1  13,452  14,486  1.2 
College  or more  14,476  19,628  5.1  22,420  26,550  2.8 
Head of matur-e  family, 
aged 45-54 
High  school  15,376  19,131  3.6  20,772  22,747  1.5 
College  or more  22,120  25,784  2.6  31,270  36,731  2.7 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on data  from  the March  CPS.  The table  shows  median  adjusted  family  income 
for various characteristics  of the head of the family. Adjusted  family income is family income divided by the 
equivalence  scale implicit  in the federal  poverty  thresholds  after 1981.  The last column  is the annual  percentage 
change  in adjusted  income. 
This conventional wisdom is less applicable today than it was 20 
years ago. Table 14 shows changes in adjusted  family income in the 
1960s  and 1980s  for families  differentiated  by the demographic  charac- 
teristics of the family head. Despite sustained  economic expansion in 
the late 1980s,  benefits  to the disadvantaged  were not as large  as in ear- 
lier  postwar  expansions.  In the 1960s,  economic  gain  was widely  distrib- 
uted. Young families (generally  poorer)  did better than older families, 
and  family  income  increased  evenly at all education  levels. Among  older 
workers,  the less educated  did even better  than  the more  educated. 
In the 1980s,  the reverse was true. Young families, and particularly 
the less educated,  fared  much  worse than  older, more  educated  families. David M. Cutler and Lawrence F. Katz  49 
The adjusted  income of families  headed  by individuals  with fewer than 
12  years of schooling,  for example,  fell by more than  2 percent  annually 
relative  to families  headed  by a college graduate.  These changes  in fam- 
ily income by demographic  group  parallel  the sharp  declines in the rela- 
tive wages of young, less educated  males that  have been documented  in 
the wage structure  literature. 
Many  explanations  have been proposed  for changes  in the U.S. wage 
structure  in the 1980s.  Most  researchers  have concluded  that  rising  wage 
inequality  largely  reflects  shifts  in labor  demand  favoring  more  educated 
and more skilled workers  over less educated and less skilled workers. 
One  hypothesis  is that  these shifts  in labor  demand  reflect  technological 
changes (possibly associated with the computer  revolution)  that have 
raised  the relative  demand  for cognitive  skills and  more  flexible  workers 
and reduced  the relative  demand  for physical labor.5'  A second view is 
that  shifts  in the industrial  and  occupational  composition  of employment 
largely  associated  with trade  deficits  and shifts in the international  divi- 
sion of labor  (outsourcing)  have led to a shift  in employment  away from 
sectors that  have traditionally  employed  less educated  males.52 
Certainly,  the industry  and occupation mix of the work force, and 
particularly  the mix for young  workers,  has changed  dramatically  in the 
past decade. Tables 15  and 16 show shares  of employment  for all work- 
ers by industry  and occupation  and for men aged 25-34 with no more 
than  a high school degree, the latter  being the group  most adversely  af- 
fected in the 1980s.  The most important  difference  between the two pe- 
riods  is the performance  of manufacturing.  The share  of employment  in 
manufacturing  increased  during  the 1960s,  particularly  for less educated 
males, but  fell by 25 percent  in the 1980s.  A similar  trend  is true  for em- 
ployment  in craft  and  operative  jobs. 
Since manufacturing  has traditionally  paid  high  wages, it is clear  how 
analysts  like Okun  latched  onto the benefits  of upgrading  in expansions. 
Even small  wage differences  between manufacturing  and  other sectors, 
coupled with the huge importance  of the manufacturing  sector for less 
educated workers, could generate large fluctuations  in income for the 
poor over the business cycle. Thus, rapid  decreases in manufacturing 
51. Allen (1991);  Bound  and  Johnson  (1989);  Krueger  (1991);  Mincer  (1991). 
52. Murphy  and  Welch  (1991).  Alternative  explanations  focus on changes  in wage-set- 
ting  institutions,  such as the decline  in unions, changes  in pay norms,  and the erosion  of 
the real  value  of the minimum  wage;  see Blackburn,  Bloom, and  Freeman  (1990). 50  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
Table 15.  Industrial and Occupational Distribution, All Workers, 
Selected Years, 1963-89 
Percent 
Sector  or job  1963  1969  1979  1983  1989 
Industry 
Agriculture  and mining  9.0  6.3  4.5  4.5  3.7 
Construction  6.1  6.1  6.6  6.5  6.8 
Manufacturing 
Durable  13.9  14.9  12.8  11.0  10.3 
Nondurable  10.9  10.6  8.7  8.1  7.2 
Transportation  and utilities  6.2  5.9  6.0  6.1  5.8 
Wholesale  trade  3.1  3.1  3.6  4.0  3.8 
Retail trade  16.4  16.3  17.7  17.6  17.9 
Professional  services  11.9  13.5  18.3  20.0  22.7 
Other  services  10.5  9.3  6.9  7.5  7.4 
Education  and welfare  6.9  8.7  9.5  9.7  9.3 
Public  administration  5.1  5.3  5.2  5.0  5.2 
Occupation 
Professional  and technical  12.0  13.5  15.2  16.4  17.1 
Managerial  10.2  9.3  10.3  12.2  14.0 
Clerical  16.4  18.0  18.7  16.0  15.8 
Sales  7.1  6.7  6.4  9.2  9.4 
Craftsmen  11.7  12.0  12.6  11.8  11.3 
Operatives  18.5  18.2  14.6  12.1  10.9 
Service  15.1  14.7  15.3  15.2  14.5 
Nonfarm  labor  5.9  5.5  5.6  6.0  5.8 
Farm  labor  3.0  2.2  1.3  1.2  1.0 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on data from the March CPS.  Industry and occupation  refer to the longest- 
held job  in the previous  year. 
employment  can have dramatic  adverse effects on the income of the 
young  and  less skilled. 
A substantial  literature  has attempted  to assess more  formally  the ex- 
tent to which the industrial  and occupational  shifts illustrated  in table 
15 can explain changes in the wage structure  in the 1980s.53  A general 
conclusion is that while the observed changes can account for some of 
the changes  in wages, these shifts do not fully explain  the magnitude  of 
the increased dispersion. Most of the wage changes have occurred 
within  industries  and occupations,  however, rather  than  across them.54 
Many have concluded from these findings  that changes in relative de- 
53. See Katz  and  Murphy  (forthcoming). 
54. Blackburn,  Bloom, and  Freeman  (1990);  Bound  and  Johnson  (1989). David M. Cutler and Lawrence F. Katz  51 
Table 16.  Industrial and Occupational Distribution, Males Aged 25-34  with High School 
Education or Less, Selected Years, 1963-89 
Percent 
Sector  or job  1963  1969  1979  1983  1989 
Industry 
Agriculture  and mining  6.9  5.7  6.0  7.5  6.7 
Construction  12.2  12.6  15.6  16.3  18.2 
Manufacturing 
Durable  22.6  26.5  22.8  17.9  16.4 
Nondurable  14.0  13.3  10.8  10.4  9.1 
Transportation  and utilities  10.8  9.9  10.7  10.5  8.6 
Wholesale  trade  4.3  3.9  4.9  5.1  4.9 
Retail  trade  13.0  12.3  12.2  13.3  14.5 
Professional  services  5.4  5.2  6.0  6.9  8.6 
Other  services  4.1  4.6  5.3  6.8  8.1 
Education  and welfare  1.2  1.1  1.3  2.0  1.7 
Public administration  5.5  4.9  4.5  3.5  3.2 
Occupation 
Professional  and technical  5.4  5.5  4.2  3.7  3.7 
Managerial  7.9  8.7  7.1  7.4  8.0 
Clerical  7.1  7.1  4.8  4.6  4.9 
Sales  4.3  3.7  3.4  4.0  3.9 
Craftsmen  24.7  27.0  32.5  30.9  29.7 
Operatives  31.8  31.0  29.4  26.5  24.5 
Service  6.4  6.5  7.7  9.7  11.4 
Nonfarm  labor  9.9  8.3  9.4  11.5  12.5 
Farm  labor  2.7  2.1  1.4  1.8  1.4 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on data from the March CPS.  Industry and occupation  refer to the longest- 
held job  in the previous  year.  High school  graduates include persons  who  attended the first year of college  but did 
not complete  the year. 
mand  within sectors, driven  by skill-based  technological  change, are a 
key to understanding  the decline in the economic status  of less educated 
young  men. 
Conclusions 
The 1980s  were far  less beneficial  to the disadvantaged  than  were pre- 
vious periods  of economic growth. Despite more than six years of sus- 
tained macroeconomic  expansion, poverty rates in 1989 were above 
those a decade earlier,  and the income share  of the poor was 10  percent 52  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
below its 1979  level. Seemingly,  many  of the traditional  benefits  of a rap- 
idly expanding  macroeconomy  did not materialize  during  this period. 
In this paper, we have shown that the failure of macroeconomic 
expansion  to provide  more  benefits  for the poor is not a consequence  of 
fundamental  changes  in the functional  distribution  of income;  appropri- 
ately measured, the share of income accruing  to labor was relatively 
constant  throughout  the 1980s.  Nor was this failure  the result  of compo- 
sitional changes in the living arrangements  of the population.  Instead, 
we argue that the key to understanding  changes in family income in- 
equality  is the rise in the returns  to skill  in the labor  market  and  the asso- 
ciated  widening  in the distribution  of individual  labor  market  opportuni- 
ties. The decline in manufacturing  employment  and  other shifts in labor 
demand  away from  less educated  workers  in the 1980s  have moderated 
the benefits of macroeconomic  growth that might have accrued to the 
disadvantaged  and  substantially  reduced  progress  in the war  on poverty. 
Given these large  and continuing  changes in family income distribu- 
tion, it is natural  to wonder  if they truly  reflect  increased  hardship  among 
the poor. We employ data  on consumption  as well as income to explore 
this issue. We conclude that changes in consumption  closely parallel 
changes in income during  the 1980s.  The share  of total consumption  by 
the lowest quintile  fell by about 1 percentage  point, from  8.2 to 7.3 per- 
cent, between 1980 and 1988. Similarly, in demographic  groups with 
large declines in income, there were correspondingly  large declines in 
consumption.  Thus, the view that income movements belie a "hidden 
prosperity  of the poor"  is not evident in data  on the consumption  of dis- 
advantaged  individuals  and  groups  over the past decade. 
These results suggest  two conclusions  for policymakers.  First, many 
of the problems  of the poor (even the working  poor) are not macroeco- 
nomic in nature. Although  increased  job availability  clearly helps the 
disadvantaged,  the conventional wisdom that industrial  and occupa- 
tional upgrading  will lift up young, less educated workers during an 
expansion need not apply when shifts in relative labor demand more 
than  offset improvements  from  increased  aggregate  job availability. 
Indeed,  as far  as their  effects on poverty  or the distribution  of income, 
changes in relative  demand,  if relatively  prolonged,  may be even more 
severe than they appear in the short run. William  Wilson and others 
have argued  that a form of "social hysteresis"  exists among  disadvan- 
taged youths, where a decline in job availability  is associated with an David M. Cutler and Lawrence F. Katz  53 
outmigration  of the middle  class, a deterioration  in the social conditions 
in inner  cities, and  an increased  incidence  of behaviors  harmful  to future 
earnings  prospects-criminal activity, drug  use, dropping  out of school, 
and teen childbearing.55  Richard  Freeman  documents  a substantial  in- 
crease in the fraction  of young, less educated males, especially young 
blacks,  in trouble  with  the law (in  prison  or on probation  or parole)  in the 
1980s  and  presents  evidence that  the presence  of a criminal  record  itself 
can lead to adverse  labor  market  outcomes  for youths.56 
Such  hysteresis  effects, if present,  imply  that  even demand  shifts  that 
are reversed in several years may have long-term  effects on the living 
standards  of the poor. In the booming  Boston labor  market  of 1989,  for 
example, the fraction of young blacks from poor neighborhoods  who 
perceived more earnings  potential in crime than in legitimate  jobs in- 
creased substantially  from  the late 1970s  to the late 1980s.57  The Boston 
experience  of the 1980s  suggests  that tight  labor  markets  alone may not 
greatly  slow the process of social disintegration  in poor neighborhoods. 
Policies designed to directly offset adverse neighborhood  and peer in- 
fluences and to keep individuals  in school may be far more important. 
Strong  macroeconomic  performance  may be a necessary but not suffi- 
cient condition  for improving  the conditions  of the disadvantaged. 
Nonetheless, the 1980s  do suggest  that  some transfer  policies may  ex- 
ert a larger  effect on the welfare of the disadvantaged  than previously 
thought.  Although  sharp  changes  in relative  labor  demand  and  increased 
wage inequality  appear widespread in industrialized  countries in the 
1980s,  the extent to which these changes  have translated  into increased 
family  poverty  appears  greater  in the United  States.58  Comparing  the ex- 
perience  of Canada  with that  of the United States is particularly  instruc- 
tive. In recent  work, Blackburn  and Bloom show that earnings  inequal- 
ity and overall family income inequality increased substantially in 
Canada  in the 1980s.  Also, Maria  Hanratty  and Blank  demonstrate,  us- 
ing a common set of poverty lines (the Canadian  Low-Income "Cut- 
offs"), that pretransfer  poverty increased  more substantially  in Canada 
than in the United States (1.9 versus 1.7 percent) between 1979 and 
55. Wilson  (1987). 
56. Freeman  (1991b). 
57. Freeman  (1991b). 
58. See Blackburn  and  Bloom  (1991a),  Katz  and  Loveman  (1990),  and  Gottschalk  and 
Joyce (1991)  for comparisons  of changes  in the wage structure  and income  inequality  in 
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1986.59  Differences  in the generosity  of the Canadian  and U.S. transfer 
systems, however, have meant  that  similar  increases  in pretransfer  pov- 
erty had very different  effects on post-transfer  poverty. Post-transfer 
poverty in Canada  actually  fell 0.7 percentage  point from 1979  to 1986, 
while post-transfer  poverty increased by more than 2.6 percentage 
points in the United States. A lesson of the 1980s  may well be that re- 
newed efforts to fashion  appropriate  transfer  policies for the disadvan- 
taged can be an important  way to enhance outcomes for the poor, in 
times of both weak and strong  macroeconomic  performance. 
APPENDIX 
The  CES  and CPS  Data 
WE  USE  DATA  from the Consumer  Expenditure  Surveys of 1960-61, 
1972-73, 1980, 1984, and 1988 to measure income and consumption 
changes. The 1960-61 surveys were conducted once each year and 
asked for annual  income and consumption.  The 1972-73 surveys were 
conducted  quarterly  but only annual  totals are released. The 1980s  sur- 
veys are conducted  and released quarterly.  For our 1980s  samples, we 
use all consumer  units  that  were present  in the four-quarter  period  from 
the second quarter  of the indicated  year (for example, 1980:2)  through 
the first  quarter  of the following  year (1981:  1). Our  annual  consumption 
measure  adds spending  for each quarter  and inflates  the total to an an- 
nual  amount.  Since the survey  requests  consumption  information  for  the 
previous three months, this comes close to measuring  calendar-year 
consumption. The weight for each consumer unit is the sum of the 
weights for each quarter  in which the consumer unit was present, di- 
vided by four. 
Definition of Income 
In the 1960-61 and 1972-73 surveys, reported  income is defined as 
annual income from the last interview for the consumer unit. In the 
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1980s surveys, income information  is asked for in the first and fourth 
quarters  of the survey. We use the annualized  value of income  from  the 
last completed interview as our income measure. For consumer units 
finishing  the four interviews (about  50 percent of our sample), income 
thus  corresponds  to the earlier  surveys;  for consumer  units  censored  be- 
fore the last interview,  income is the value reported  in the first  survey. 
Income  in the 1960-61  survey  is not topcoded. Income  in the 1972-73 
survey is both topcoded (2.3 percent of the consumer units) and bot- 
tomcoded  (6.9 percent  of the consumer  units). For topcoded consumer 
units, we use the conditional  mean income above $25,000  to impute  in- 
come.60  For bottomcoded  consumer  units, we first identify those con- 
sumer  units that  reported  no labor  income, retirement  income, or other 
transfer  income and assign these units zero income. We then imputed 
average income for the remaining  consumer units to match aggregate 
mean  income  below $3,000.61 
In the 1980  survey, 1.7  percent  of the consumer  units  were topcoded, 
with  income  for these consumer  units  set to zero. We imputed  a common 
income for these consumer units to  match average income above 
$30,000.62  In the 1984  and 1988  surveys, a relatively  small  share  of con- 
sumer  units  were topcoded (0.5 and 0.7 percent). Only  the components 
of income  were topcoded, however, so that  some income  above the top- 
coded level is reported,  although  it is not exact. We leave topcoded  con- 
sumer  units  at their  topcoded  value. Our  results  are  generally  insensitive 
to the treatment  of consumer  units above the topcoded  values. 
Definition of Expenditure and Consumption 
We adjust  the expenditure  data to reflect two changes in definitions 
over time. In the 1960-61  and 1972-73  surveys, insurance  payments  (life 
and other personal  insurance  as well as social security and retirement 
contributions)  were not treated  as expenditures,  but  they were included 
in expenditures  in the 1980s. We therefore  add these payments to ex- 
penditures  in the 1960-61  and 1972-73  surveys. 
In addition,  cash contributions  are  only surveyed  in the last interview 
in the 1980s, so that this item is missing  for about half of the consumer 
60. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (1978,  table 1). 
61. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (1978,  table 1). 
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units. A natural  solution  is to impute  cash contributions  for the remain- 
ing consumer  units and add that to total expenditures.  Using predicted 
values  for only some consumer  units, however, would  artificially  reduce 
the variance  of expenditures  in later  surveys  relative  to earlier  ones. We 
thus predicted  cash contributions  for all consumer  units in all years and 
used predicted  cash contributions  in place of actual contributions.  For 
each year, predicted  cash contributions  are based on a regression  of an- 
nual  cash contributions  on total expenditures  (less cash contributions), 
income before taxes, the age of the household  head, and dummy  vari- 
ables for the sex and education  of the household  head (details  are avail- 
able from  the authors).  Our  results  are  generally  insensitive  to the treat- 
ment  of cash contributions. 
We form consumption  from total expenditures  in three steps. First, 
we exclude spending  on owned  homes  for consumer  units  who own their 
house and include the imputed  rental  value in consumption.  Since not 
all surveys  asked  about  the rental  value  of housing  (the 1960-61  and 1980 
surveys did not), we imputed  rental values using data on the market 
value  of owned  homes. For the 1972-73, 1984,  and 1988  surveys, we first 
regressed  the reported  rental  value on the market  value of housing. We 
then used the estimated  equation  for 1972-73  and the reported  market 
value in 1960-61  to predict  rental  values in 1960-61. We used the 1984 
equation  and the 1980  market  value to predict  rental  values in 1980.  As 
with the cash-contribution  adjustment,  using imputed values in only 
some years  would  artificially  lower  the variance  of consumption  in those 
years relative to years with more complete information.  We thus used 
our regressions  to predict  rental  values for every year and  used these in 
place of the imputed  rental  values. 
In the second step, we subtracted  spending  on new and  used vehicles 
from expenditures  and added  the imputed  rental  value of existing vehi- 
cles in its place. To find the imputed  rental value, we took consumer 
units  that  reported  spending  on new and  used vehicles and  regressed  the 
amount of that spending  on total expenditures  (less vehicle expendi- 
tures), expenditures  squared,  income before taxes, the age of the refer- 
ence person,  dummy  variables  for the sex and  education  of the reference 
person, and the size of the consumer  unit. We estimated  this equation 
for  each year  and  predicted  the value  of new spending  for  each consumer 
unit. The imputed  vehicle consumption  is then the predicted  value of 
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ported  owning  times an assumed  depreciation  factor  (one-eighth  of pur- 
chase value). Finally, since the 1972-73  surveys capped the number  of 
owned vehicles at two, we artificially  impose this cap in other years 
(with  little effect on the results). 
Finally, we subtract  life and other personal  insurance  expenditures, 
as well as employee contributions  to social security  and  other  pensions, 
from  consumption.  This will be correct  if consumer  units treat  these as 
a tax or as saving  rather  than  as consumption. 
To form  our component-deflated  real consumption  measure,  we sep- 
arated  total  consumption  into twelve components:  food and  alcohol;  ap- 
parel;  shelter;  fuels, utilities,  and  public  services;  household  operations; 
house furnishings  and equipment;  vehicles; other transportation  ex- 
penses; health care; entertainment;  cash contributions;  and all other 
goods and services. We used the category-specific  CPI  inflation  rates to 
inflate  consumption  to 1988  dollars. Because the average CPI inflation 
rate is different  from the PCE inflation  rate over this period, the mean 
consumption  differs between the aggregate  and individually  weighted 
estimates. 
For  the 1980s  surveys, the definitions  of the spending  categories  were 
relatively  constant;  some changes  were made  in category  definitions  be- 
tween the pre-1980s  surveys and  the 1980s  surveys, however. Using the 
documentation  provided by the BLS,63  we attempted to regroup as 
many of the categories into 1980s definitions  as we could. For some 
changes, however, we lacked sufficient  detail to make the categories 
fully comparable. 
Definition of CES Sample 
Table  Al describes  the CES sample  and our modifications  to it. The 
first  column  shows the size of the original  CES sample.  The  first  two sur- 
veys include a greater number  of respondents, since they were con- 
ducted over two years. Nevertheless, we still have about 10,000  con- 
sumer  units in the surveys in the 1980s. 
Because the survey  methodology  has changed  through  time, we make 
a number  of modifications  to the original  sample.  Our  first  elimination  is 
for incomplete  income reporters,  as defined  by the CES. The 1960-61 
63. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (1985,  table  C-6, pp. 150-51;  1978,  table  B, p. 21). 58  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
Table Al.  Description of CES Data 
Share of sample 
Reason  for elimination  (percent) 
Initial  Incomplete  Missing  Final  Above  Below 
Year  sample  reporter  or refuse  sample  age 65  age 25 
1960-61  13,728  0  9  13,719  18.9  4.8 
1972-73  19,975  1,072  215  18,688  20.0  8.9 
1980  9,971  1,609  252  8,110  20.9  9.5 
1984  10,353  1,080  689  8,584  20.2  9.5 
1988  9,994  1,447  348  8,199  20.9  7.2 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on data from the CES. 
public-use  release contains  only complete reporters;  the other surveys 
have varying  amounts  of incomplete  responses, ranging  from 5.4 per- 
cent (1972-73) to 16.1 percent (1980). The second column of table Al 
shows the number  eliminated  by this criterion. 
The second modification  is from  changes  in the definition  of complete 
income  reporters  over time. Before  the 1980s,  consumer  units  were clas- 
sified  as incomplete  reporters  if the primary  family  earner  reported  being 
employed  but listed no employment  income, or if the consumer  unit  re- 
ported pension or social security income but did not provide dollar 
amounts.  In the 1980s,  however, consumer  units were considered  com- 
plete income reporters  if they listed any major  source of income, inde- 
pendent  of other  income responses. Income  is thus substantially  under- 
stated  in the 1980s  for many  consumer  units  who report  being  employed 
but having no employment  income or who are in a position to collect 
pension or social security income but do not report any. This under- 
counting  is offset somewhat  by the treatment  of consumer  units  with no 
income of any type. Before 1980, these consumer  units were valid re- 
porters  if there  was no evidence of refusal  to answer  income questions. 
In the 1980s,  consumer  units with no income of any form were consid- 
ered incomplete  reporters.T4 
To account for changing  definitions  of complete income responses, 
we imposed  a uniform  selection  criterion  across years. In addition  to the 
CES-designated  incomplete  reporters,  we eliminated  from  the pre-1980 
surveys consumer  units  with no income  from  any source. For the 1980s 
surveys, we excluded consumer  units where labor  income for the head 
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of the consumer  unit  or spouse was not provided  ("a  blank  resulting  from 
a 'don't know', refusals, or other types of non-responses")  and where 
the head of the household  or spouse reported  earning  income (wage or 
salary;  farm  self-employment  or nonfarm  self-employment)  but  listed no 
labor  income of any form. The number  of omissions of this form is de- 
tailed  in the third  column  of table Al. These omissions are only about 1 
percent  of the 1972-73 sample, but more than 6 percent  of the 1984  re- 
spondents were eliminated because of incomplete information.  The 
fourth  column  shows the final  number  of observations  for each year. As 
best we can ascertain,  our consumption  distributions  are unaffected  by 
the exclusion of either set of incomplete  income reporters;  income dis- 
tributions  are only marginally  affected  by our additional  exclusions be- 
yond complete  income  reporters. 
A final  modification  is for households  of different  ages. Since much  of 
our  work  focuses on changes  in market  opportunities,  we present  results 
for both the total sample  and for consumer  units headed by nonelderly 
individuals.  As table Al shows, about  20 percent  of the consumer  units 
are headed  by an elderly individual.  A second issue concerns the treat- 
ment of college students. The CES has not been uniform  on this over 
time. In the 1960-61  and 1972-73  surveys, college students  living away 
from  home were considered  part  of their  parents'  consumer  unit;  in the 
1980s  surveys, these students  were treated  as separate  consumer  units. 
Since income is low and  consumption  is high  for many  college students, 
this change could bias measures of consumption  inequality. We have 
thus explored the results omitting  consumer  units headed by a person 
below the age of 25 (shown  in the last column  of the table). None of our 
results change substantially  with this exclusion, so we do not present 
them. These results  are available  on request. 
Description  of CPS Data 
Our  income  distributions  are  primarily  based  on the March  Consumer 
Population  Survey Annual  Demographic  Supplements.  We use as our 
base sample  all persons in the United States; we thus do not automati- 
cally exclude persons in the military  or living  in group  quarters. 
To form  poverty  rates, we classify families  in all years into the 48 of- 
ficial categories used after 198165  and use these thresholds.  To form a 
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poverty line deflated  by the personal  consumption  expenditures  index 
rather  than  the consumer  price index, we assume that the 1967  poverty 
line was the appropriate  measure  of poverty and adjust  the poverty  line 
from  that  year. 
Our  definition  of families  differs  from  the census definition  in two re- 
spects. First, we include  individuals  (persons  living alone or living in a 
household  but not related  to the household  head) as families, while the 
census definition  excludes these persons. Second, and more minor,  we 
count  unrelated  subfamilies  as families  for all years, although  the census 
excludes them from families after 1979. Since most of our tabulations 
are performed  for persons rather  than  for families, these issues are not 
relevant;  they are relevant  in our distribution  of the family breakdown 
of the population. 
Annual  income  data  is topcoded  in all years, but  the topcoding  affects 
a relatively  small  share  of the population  after 1979.  For the years  before 
1979,  we assume  that  the income  of topcoded  families  was 1.4  times  their 
reported  income. We have found  our  results  insensitive  to the treatment 
of topcoded  individuals. 
Comparison of CES and CPS Data 
Table A2 compares  per capita income in the CES with per capita  in- 
come in the CPS.66  The two income measures  are conceptually  similar: 
both include wage and salary income, social security and pension in- 
come, and government  cash transfers.  Neither includes employer  con- 
tributions  to health insurance  or other noncash income. The first  three 
columns  present  per capita  income  for the CES (our  modified  complete- 
response definition)  and  the CPS. The table shows a dramatic  decline in 
income in the CES relative  to the CPS. Income in 1972-73  is 5 percent 
higher  in the CES than in the CPS, but income in the 1980s  is 8-12 per- 
cent lower in the CES. The next three columns show similar  compari- 
sons for the nonelderly  sample. The change is similar  but slightly less 
dramatic.  Income  in the CES is still 11  percent  below income  in the CPS 
66. There  is no exact comparison  between  CES consumer  units  and  CPS  households. 
A household  in the CPS is a group of persons sharing  living quarters,  independent  of 
whether  there  are any shared  expenses. Persons  in the same  consumer  unit  are either  re- 
lated  or share  at least two of the three  major  expense  categories:  housing,  food, and  other 
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Table A2.  Comparison of CES and CPS per Capita Income 
1988  dollars,  unless otherwise  noted 
All households  Nonelderly  households 
CESICPS  CESICPS 
Year  CES  CPS  (ratio)  CES  CPS  (ratio) 
1960-61  7,155  .  ...  7,136  ...  ... 
1972-73  10,746  10,191  1.054  10,844  10,277  1.055 
1980  10,169  10,987  0.926  10,302  11,067  0.931 
1984  10,986  11,913  0.922  11,217  11,877  0.944 
1988  11,379  12,908  0.882  11,591  12,984  0.893 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on  data  from  the  March  CPS  and  the  CES.  The  CES  sample  excludes 
incomplete  reporters and persons  with missing or refused income.  CPS income is household  income  per capita. Data 
are adjusted to  1988 using the personal consumption  expenditure deflator for each  year. 
in 1989,  with the largest  change  occurring  between 1972-73  and 1980.  A 
comparison  of the two columns  indicates  that income underreporting  is 
greater  for the elderly  than  for the nonelderly.  The decline in income in 
the CES relative  to the CPS has been noted by other researchers,67  but 
there has been little satisfactory  explanation. For our income tabula- 
tions, we use the more  complete  CPS  income, although  as table  8 shows, 
the income shares  at a point in time look relatively  similar. 
Quality of CES Consumption Data 
The expenditure  data  in the CES appear  to be more  consistent  across 
surveys, although  it too has trended  down relative to other measures. 
Raymond  Gieseman  shows that CES spending  on food declined  from  85 
percent  of the PCE  total  in 1980  to 75 percent  in 1984.68  Most of the other 
components,  however, remained  relatively  similar.  In separate  studies, 
Slesnick  and  John  Sabelhaus  compare  CES consumption  data  with data 
in the national  income  accounts  for the 1970s  and 1980s.69  For almost  all 
categories  of consumption,  there  is a decline  in consumption  in the CES 
relative to personal consumption  expenditures  in the national  income 
accounts. Although  some of this is due to items not covered by the CES 
(such as medical payments by insurance  companies and banking  ser- 
vices), the decline occurs in areas  of substantial  overlap  as well (such as 
food and  energy  expenditures). 
67. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (1985,  pp. 4-5). 
68. Gieseman  (1987). 
69. Slesnick  (1991b);  Sabelhaus  (1990). Comments 
and Discussion 
David Card: In analyzing  the effects of macroeconomic  variables  on 
the aggregate  poverty  rate,  I think  it is helpful  both  conceptually  and  em- 
pirically  to separate  the effects of these variables  on the mean and dis- 
persion of family income. To see why, suppose that family income is 
approximately  log normally  distributed  with mean  m and standard  devi- 
ation  s, and  let c denote the poverty  line. In this stylized setting  the pov- 
erty rate is N[(c  - m)s], where N[.]  is the normal distribution function. 
Increases in median  family  income imply  an increase  in the mean  of log 
income and a reduction  in the poverty rate. On the other hand, as long 
as the poverty line is below median  income, increases in the dispersion 
of income  imply  an increase  in the poverty  rate  (holding  constant  median 
income). 
It is my impression  that  in earlier  periods  of economic  growth  median 
family  income grew relatively  quickly  and the dispersion  in income fell 
(at least relative to trend). Both effects worked in the same direction, 
implying a strong negative correlation between growth and poverty 
rates. During  the economic recovery of the 1980s,  however, there was 
an increase in the inequality  of income, tending  to offset the poverty- 
reducing  effects of higher  median  family  income. In future  work  on pov- 
erty and  growth  it would  be useful  to know  (1)  whether  the historical  link 
between median  family income and simple macroeconomic  indicators 
was maintained  in the 1980s,  (2) whether  income dispersion  was pro-  or 
countercyclical  in the period  up  to 1983,  and  (3)  how much  of the "excess 
poverty"  depicted  in David Cutler  and Lawrence  Katz's figure  2 can be 
attributed  to the rise in the dispersion  of family income over the 1980s 
and how much  to the relatively  sluggish  growth  of median  income. 
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Table 1. Poverty  Rates  of Individuals  in 1979  and 1989, by Census  Region 
Percent 
Poverty rate  Change 
Region  1979  1989  in rate 
New England  9.6  7.2  -2.4 
Middle  Atlantic  11.7  11.0  -0.7 
East North Central  10.3  11.9  1.6 
West North Central  11.0  11.7  0.7 
South Atlantic  13.9  12.7  -  1.2 
East South Central  18.7  18.6  -0.1 
West South Central  15.6  17.8  2.2 
Mountain  11.9  13.1  1.2 
Pacific  11.1  12.3  1.2 
All United States  12.4  12.8  0.4 
Sources:  The  1979 data are based  on the  1980 census  and are formed  from weighted  averages  of  state  poverty 
rates reported in Detailed  Population  Characteristics,  Series PC80-1-D, table 245. The 1989 data are based on Bureau 
of the Census  (1991a, table 20). 
Are Growth  and Poverty Still Related? 
Cutler  and  Katz conclude  that  in many  respects the main  problems  of 
the poor (even the working  poor) are not macroeconomic  in nature. I 
cannot disagree.  Three decades of study of microdata  on earnings,  un- 
employment,  and poverty confirm  that most of the difficulties  faced by 
the poor are associated with individual-specific  factors, such as educa- 
tion, health, and family background.  Nevertheless, I hesitate to con- 
clude  that  economic  prosperity  at the aggregate  level is unimportant.  My 
reasoning  is based on "macroeconomic"  evidence at a slightly lower 
level of aggregation.  For example, my table 1 presents data  on poverty 
rates in 1979  and 1989  in the nine census regions of the United States. 
Despite the relative stability  of the national  poverty rate, different  re- 
gions experienced  very different  poverty  trends,  ranging  from  a 2.4 per- 
centage  point  decline  in New England  to a 2.2 percentage  point  increase 
in the West South Central  region (Arkansas,  Texas, and Oklahoma). 
These changes are highly correlated  with regional changes in unem- 
ployment. 
The data in table 1 may be very relevant  for thinking  about the con- 
nection between macroeconomic  growth, changes in median income, 
changes  in the dispersion  of income, and  changes  in poverty. The recov- 64  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1991 
ery of the 1980s  was associated with an unusual  dispersion in growth 
rates across different  regions  and sectors of the economy. This contrib- 
uted to the overall  dispersion  in individual  and  family  income  across the 
country and to the breakdown  in the historical  link between aggregate 
growth and poverty. Nevertheless, within individual labor markets 
there was still a strong connection between "macroeconomic"  perfor- 
mance  and poverty.  I I conjecture  that the same process of skill upgrad- 
ing  measured  by Arthur  Okun  using  national  data  for the 1960s  and 1970s 
occurred  in the booming  regions  of the country  in the 1980s.  However, 
these changes occurred  at the same time that other  factors led to an in- 
crease in the dispersion  of incomes across regions. 
Measuring  Consumption versus Income 
Much of the work in the authors'  paper  is devoted to analyzing  the 
changing  distribution  of consumption.  Although  I commend  this effort, 
I believe that some of the criticisms  of income statistics  as a measure  of 
individual  well-being  are  misplaced.  One  criticism  is that  these statistics 
contain  transitory  fluctuations  that over- and understate  true economic 
well-being. This is surely true, but of little significance  in interpreting 
mean income levels by demographic  characteristic  (schooling  or race, 
for example).  Mean  earnings  levels of less educated  workers  have fallen 
sharply  over the 1980s.  These losses have not been offset by increased 
transfers  (as was apparently  the case in Canada).  It follows directly  that 
these individuals,  who form  the bulk  of the poor, are  permanently  worse 
off  .2 
Even at the individual  level only some part  of the observed year-to- 
year fluctuations  in earnings  is transitory.  Most studies suggest  that  60- 
70 percent of the innovations  in individual  income persist indefinitely. 
Unless this ratio has changed over time, there is no reason to suspect 
that changes in  the  distribution of  observed annual income give 
a misleading picture of changes in the distribution  of "permanent" 
income. 
1.A  similar  conclusion  is reached  by Freeman  (1991a)  in an analysis  of the labor  force 
status  of black  youth  across  different  cities in the United  States. 
2. This  is essentially  the idea  behind  Cutler  and  Katz's  figure  7. David M. Cutler and Lawrence F. Katz  65 
Robert  E. Hall: Rising  economic  inequality  was a striking  feature  of the 
U.S. social landscape  in the 1980s. Successful people enjoyed substan- 
tial gains in real  income  during  the decade, while real  income  fell among 
the less educated  and disadvantaged  parts  of the population.  Research 
seems to agree  that  this  finding  is not a statistical  artifact.  Both this  paper 
by David  Cutler  and  Lawrence  Katz as well as the complementary  paper 
in this volume by Chinhui  Juhn, Kevin Murphy,  and Robert  Topel find 
large  increases  in inequality  in the 1980s. 
Cutler  and Katz start  from  the observation  that the 1980s  saw a long 
and powerful  expansion  in overall economic activity. The most salient 
historical comparison  is to the expansion of the 1960s. In the earlier 
expansion, the income distribution  tightened. As  Arthur Okun ob- 
served, the high-pressure  economy conferred differential  benefits on 
workers  with lower levels of earnings.  Cutler  and Katz add to the evi- 
dence that  the expansion  of the 1980s  was accompanied  by the opposite 
change, a widening  of the income distribution.  They carry  out a detailed 
and  immensely  impressive  investigation  of the sources of that  widening. 
To get a sense of the magnitude  of their overall accomplishment,  just 
consider  the amount  of work  that  went into  the project  described  in foot- 
note 43. 
Cutler  and Katz consider five sources of the changes in the income 
distribution.  I list them in declining  order  of empirical  significance:  (1) 
increasing  dispersion  of earnings  within  industries,  which  they find  to be 
by far  the most important  factor;  (2) a decline, rather  than  an expansion, 
in manufacturing,  a sector that offers high earnings to less educated 
workers  and a source of declining  inequality  in the 1960s;  (3) cutbacks 
in transfer  programs;  (4) rising  capital  income, which goes virtually  en- 
tirely  to the top of the income distribution;  and (5) declining  numbers  of 
earners  in low-income  families. 
With respect to increasing  dispersion  of earnings  within industries, 
Cutler  and Katz leave to Juhn, Murphy,  and Topel the interesting  task 
of breaking  down the change into increases in the dispersion  of annual 
hours of work. The latter authors  show that the two factors are about 
equally important  in the overall increase in earnings  dispersion. They 
show that there was a large increase in the nonemployment  rate at the 
bottom of the wage distribution  (but not elsewhere in the distribution). 
They also show that  there  was a large  decline  in real  wages at the bottom 
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Cutler  and Katz's concern with measuring  sources rather  than pro- 
viding  fundamental  explanations  leaves the reader  with  only a glimpse  of 
their thinking  about those explanations.  They remark  that the earnings 
decline at the bottom of the distribution  arises from "changes in labor 
demand  against  the less skilled." It is the duty of the discussant  of this 
type of paper  to speculate  freely on the mechanisms  underlying  the em- 
pirical  findings.  The skill-bias  hypothesis may find some support,  even 
though  it contradicts  a traditional  belief about technical  progress.  That 
belief holds that technical  change is a slow, steady process. What  was 
different  about  technical  change  in the 1960s  that  made  it favor  the disad- 
vantaged,  when in the 1980s  it went against  them?  Specific  innovations, 
especially those based on modern  electronics, are not obviously biased 
against  the poorly educated. For example, McDonald's  now uses cash 
registers  with  pictures  of each item, rather  than  having  its cashiers  enter 
prices. On the other hand, recent work by Alan Krueger shows that 
workers  who use computers  enjoy a wage premium  of 10 to 15 percent 
and that the rapid  growth in the fraction  of the labor force using com- 
puters  is an important  factor  in changing  the distribution  of earnings.  1 
Although it is true that changes in the composition of output have 
favored  the educated  desk worker  over the less educated  worker  on the 
plant  floor, this paper  and others are persuasive  that the changing  com- 
position of output is a small part of the story. And this paper makes it 
clear why the composition  effects must  be small. Even the professional 
services-FIRE sector, the quintessential  growth  industry  of the 1980s, 
employs a substantial  number of workers who have no college (see 
table 16). 
Pursuing  my duty  to speculate  freely, I note that  Cutler  and  Katz  give 
no attention  to one of the social forces that has received a good deal of 
attention  in other commentary  on the 1970s  and 1980s, the deferral  of 
adulthood.  Table 14 shows that the biggest contrast  between the 1980s 
and the 1960s was in families with the youngest heads of households 
(less than  25 years of age). The trend  during  the 1980s  was toward  start- 
ing serious  adult  activities  later-there was a pronounced  increase  in the 
median age of marriage  and in childbearing,  and probably  at least as 
large  a deferral  in the onset of a serious  career.  Some part  of the growing 
lower tail of the earnings  distribution  may  be the result  of people in their 
1.  Krueger (1991). David M. Cutler and Lawrence F. Katz  67 
twenties continuing  teenage  labor  supply  patterns.  On the other  hand,  a 
widening  of the wage distribution  has occurred  among  earlier  cohorts as 
well, so a good part  of the explanation  must  rest on other  factors. 
This is a good place to make  a point  that  has equal  importance  for the 
paper  by Juhn,  Murphy,  and Topel. It is tempting  to say that whatever 
happened  in the labor  market  for low-wage  workers  was an adverse de- 
mand  shift, because both employment  and  the wage declined.  That  con- 
clusion  rests on the untenable  hypothesis  that  the workers  were offering 
the same service at the beginning  and end of the period. If a particular 
group  has lowered  the quality  of its labor  services, one would expect to 
see exactly the combination  of lower wage and  lower employment  with- 
out any shift  in demand  for the group.  Hence the supply  side of the labor 
market  cannot  be neglected. 
In the same vein, I was surprised  at the amount  of attention  that the 
"hidden  prosperity"  view of Christopher  Jencks received here, in com- 
parison  with the little mention  of the social indicators  that show patho- 
logical  change. 
To probe the outer limits of speculation  permissible,  I think  the hy- 
pothesis needs to be considered that disadvantaged  workers have far 
fewer  problem-solving  skills  when they leave school today, as compared 
with earlier decades. More television and less parental attention at 
home, combined  with the collapse of educational  effectiveness in inner- 
city school systems, leaves the labor-force  entrant  less well equipped  to 
deal with the challenges of any type of higher-wage  job, blue or white 
collar. Again, the observation  that wages have declined does not fore- 
close this line of explanation  at all. But the effects that are uniform 
across cohorts  cannot  be explained  by the adverse  characteristics  of the 
younger  cohorts. 
Cutler  and Katz have cut off an obvious area  for my speculation,  the 
difference  between income and consumption.  Irving  Fisher convinced 
me a long time ago that  the right  measure  of well-being  is consumption, 
not income. Cutler  and  Katz make  a substantial  contribution  to the liter- 
ature on growing  inequality  by showing that much the same growth  in 
inequality  has occurred in consumption. Growth in the dispersion of 
transitory  income is not the reason  for growing  income inequality. 
Still, the evidence of consumption  does not completely close the is- 
sue of the dynamics  of poverty. Liquidity  constraints  are  a fact of life for 
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income is low  just because its consumption  today is low. The rise in the 
incidence  of poverty  would  be less worrisome  if today's poor  family  typ- 
ically moved well up the income distribution  in the future. In this re- 
spect, it would be desirable  to look at the distribution  of consumption 
over much  longer  periods  than  a year. I doubt  that such an investigation 
would much  change  the dismal  conclusions, however. 
Cutler and Katz's investigation  of the distribution  of consumption 
has uncovered  the disturbing  fact that the Consumer  Expenditure  Sur- 
vey, potentially  the best data source, has drifted  badly relative to the 
CPS (with respect to income) and the national  income accounts (with 
respect to consumption).  I am not sure I share their confidence in the 
reliability  of changes in the distribution  of consumption  given the large 
problems  revealed  in table  A2. 
Although  the authors  consider  the differences  between total  compen- 
sation and cash wages, there are a couple of elements omitted  from  the 
actual  distributional  measurements  that  are  big enough  to make  a differ- 
ence. First, over the period considered, there was a large increase in 
payroll  taxes. The best way to include their effect in the distributional 
calculation  (short of measuring  lifetime consumption)  would be to in- 
clude the accrual  of pension and other deferred  benefits earned  by the 
worker  as a result  of one year's work. Given the progressivity  of social 
security  benefits, there could be a significant  tightening  of the distribu- 
tion of earnings. Second, there was continuing  growth in employer-fi- 
nanced  fringes  over the period. These probably  have their  biggest pro- 
portional  effect toward the middle of the earning  distribution,  so the 
effect of imputing  their value to the individual  would be smaller  for the 
lower-tail  calculations  that  most concern  Cutler  and Katz. 
This  paper  and  the companion  one by Juhn,  Murphy,  and  Topel  cover 
the descriptive  ground  very thoroughly.  I have very few suggestions  for 
practical improvements. I congratulate  the authors for an incredible 
piece of work and a highly  informative  product.  The next step, it seems 
to me, is to pursue  the fundamental  explanations,  whether  on the side of 
technology  (that  is, demand)  or that  of worker  characteristics  and  other 
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General Discussion 
Robert Topel was  skeptical of Robert Hall's explanation that a 
change in the quality  of the workers  entering  the labor  market  was re- 
sponsible  for the deterioration  of incomes in the lower part  of the distri- 
bution.  He noted  that  inequality  has been rising  within  all cohorts, a fact 
that did not accord  with Hall's explanation.  Lawrence  Katz added  that 
the proliferation  of computers  in the workplace  was the kind  of develop- 
ment consistent with the technological  explanation  for the changing  in- 
come distribution.  Computers  shift the mix of labor  toward  higher-edu- 
cated workers, and people who work with computers  generally  receive 
larger  wage premiums  than people who do not. However, Hall noted 
that  computers  were often  used to adapt  jobs to the skills  of the available 
work force, citing the example of automatic  cash registers  whose keys 
used pictures  of the items being sold. 
Edward  Gramlich  asked whether the growing  importance  of fringe 
benefits in compensation,  particularly  the large and exploding  cost of 
health insurance, could explain some of the observed wage shift. But 
Katz replied  that taking  account  of fringe  benefits  like health  insurance 
and  pension  benefits  exacerbates  the overall  picture  of rising  inequality. 
George  Perry  suggested  that  the decline  in the U.S. minimum  wage rela- 
tive to average  wages could help explain  the worsening  relative  position 
of low-income  families. Katz did not agree, because the minimum  wage 
was mainly  relevant  for people in the 16-  to 20-year-old  age group.  Wil- 
liam  Nordhaus  suggested  that  the favorable  experience  of the top 5 per- 
cent of the income  distribution  was an even bigger  puzzle than  the expe- 
rience of individuals  in lower income categories. He knew of no ready 
sociological or technological  explanation  for why the skills or market 
value of high-income  individuals  suddenly  increased  during  the 1980s. 
Robert Gordon  observed that countries  in Europe have not experi- 
enced the same increase  in inequality  as the United States has and sug- 
gested looking for differences  that could explain the dissimilar  experi- 
ence of the disadvantaged.  He suggested that more flexible U.S. labor 
markets,  at a time of low productivity  growth, might  have led not only 
to low real wage growth  but indirectly  to an increase in inequality.  One 
clue was that the ratio of productivity  growth in nonmanufacturing  to 70  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
manufacturing  was 0.9 in France  and only 0.1 in the United States. Per- 
haps the U.S. economy, with its flexible  labor  markets,  was able to cre- 
ate many  service-sector  jobs with low productivity  and  low wages. Gor- 
don also suggested that the different experiences of Europe and the 
United States cast doubt on the idea that a technological  shift reduced 
the demand  for low-skilled  workers, since technology crosses borders 
rapidly.  Katz replied  that not all European  countries have had experi- 
ences so different  from  the United States, noting  that the United King- 
dom  looks very much  like the United States on every measure  of within- 
group inequality and also that Canada  experienced a big increase in 
overall inequality  across households. Katz suggested that one reason 
France  is different  is because of its minimum  wage policy. He believed 
a major  shift  in relative  demand  in favor  of more skilled  workers  has oc- 
curred  in most countries. However, different  countries  respond  to the 
shift in different ways because of their labor market institutions. In 
places like France, with more rigidities  in the labor market, the shift 
shows up more in higher  unemployment  of the less skilled and less in 
widening  income  disparities. David M. Cutler and Lawrence F. Katz  71 
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